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VERTICAL COLLUSION
I. INTRODUCTION

In his classic book, American Capitalism,' John Kenneth Galbraith argued that concentrations of economic power are not the
social evil that antitrust advocates had traditionally believed them
to be. Countervailing power, not classical competition, he said,
2
was the instrument for keeping concentrated power in check.
The actual or real restraints on a firm's market power are, according to Galbraith, vested not in its competitors but in its customers and suppliers; they are imposed not from the same side,
but from the opposite side of the market. Thus, "private economic
power is held in check by the countervailing power of those who
are subject to it. The first begets the second." 3 A monopoly on one
side of the market offers an inducement to both suppliers and customers to develop the power with which they can defend themselves against exploitation. Thesis gives rise to antithesis, and
there emerges a system of checks and balances which makes the
economy as a whole workable, a modus operandi which lends stability to American capitalism. Most importantly, this system of
checks and balances relieves the government of its obligation-imposed by the now antiquated antitrust laws-to launch any frontal
attack on concentrated economic power. No longer need the government be concerned about the decline of competition or the
sparsity of sellers in a particular market. Countervailing power
can be relied on to eliminate the danger of any long run exploitation by a private economic power bloc.
Put differently, countervailing power operates primarily
through the creation of bilateral monopoly and/or oligopoly situations. A monopoly on one side of the market finds its power neutralized by the appearance of a monopoly on the other side of the
market. Thus, a system of checks and balances is built on the
foundation of bilateral power concentrations.
Galbraith cites the labor market as an area where the operation
of countervailing power can be observed with the greatest clarity,
for it is in the labor market that giant unions bargain on a national,
industry-wide scale against groups of employers acting jointly
either through a trade association or an informal ad hoc bargaining
committee. 4 Galbraith sees countervailing power at work in highly
1. J.K. GALBRAm, AMERICAN CAPITALISM: THE CONCEPT OF COUNTERVAILING
POWER (1952).
2. For early critiques of Galbraith's theory, see generally Adams, Competition,

Monopoly, and CountervailingPower, 67 Q.J. ECONS. 469 (1953); Schwartz,
Book Review, 81 HARv. L. REV. 915 (1968); Stigler, The Economist Plays With
Blocs, 44 A. ECON..REv. 7 (1954).
3. J. GALBRArTH, supra note 1, at 118.
4. Id. at 110.
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concentrated industries like the steel, rubber, and automobile
manufacturing industries, and points out that "[n] ot only has the
strength of the corporations in these industries made it necessary
for workers to develop the protection of countervailing power, it
has provided unions with the opportunity for getting something
more as well. If successful they could share in the fruits of the
corporation's market power."5 Thus, Galbraith justifies bilateral
monopoly in the labor market because it prevents unilateral exploitation, while simultaneously allowing one monopolist to share
in whatever exorbitant gains may accrue to the other.
But bilateral monopoly in the labor market has further consequences. According to pure economic theory, this type of market
structure is characterized by what Heinrich von Stackelberg aptly
called Gleichgewichtslosigkeit-anincapacity to achieve a stable
equilibrium.6 The inherent and irreconcilable conflict between the
bilateral monopolists can be rationally resolved (in the best interest of both parties) only if they agree to enter into a vertical combination or conspiracy. Such coalescence, of course, represents a
compromise-a case of mutual forbearance-in order to achieve
joint profit maximization. And, says Stackelberg, profits will be
maximized for the bilateral monopolists if, for example, in labormanagement confrontations, the employer (a monopsonist in the
labor market) enjoys a monopoly in the sale of his products. 7 In
other words, market control or market dominance in the product
market serves not only the best interests of management but also
the best interests of labor. Hence, a bilateral monopoly situation
naturally militates toward coalescence of power between management and labor, not antagonism or countervailance of power.
Understandably, this insight (which is neither profound nor esoteric) was used by the exponents of industrial cartels as a prime
argument to persuade workers that cartels were in labor's best interests. Robert Liefmann, for example, pointed out that cartels
were in a better position than competitive firms to grant wage increases, because they could pass the resulting cost increases on to
consumers in the form of higher prices:
5. Id. at 122. In fairness to Galbraith, it must be noted that he recognizes irlflationary periods as special situations in which countervailing power tends to
be ineffective.
6. H. STACKELBERG, MA RKTORM UND GLEICHGEWICHT (1934).
7. Id. at 100: ("Eine Erhjhung des gemeinsames Gewinnes kommt hier nur
dann zustande, wenn der Nachfrager des bilateralen Monopols zugleich aber
ein einfaches Angebotsmonopol auf dem Markte seiner Produkte verfflgt."
Translated, this passage states: an increase in the joint profit becomes possible only if the buyer in the bilateral monopoly situation also enjoys a monopoly over the product which he sells.).
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Where the firms are in a cartel, they are more inclined to concede the
workers higher wages than in a state of free competition, because they
find it easier to pass the increased costs on to their customers by charging
higher prices. The workers will therefore, generally speaking, find it easier to impose higher wages upon organized firms, and it is in their power,
at least if they can form strong trade unions, to demand wages increasing
with the cartel's prices, i.e., a "sliding wage-scale."8

Thus, said Liefmann, market dominance and market control (i.e.,
cartels and monopolies) were in the best interests of labor as well
as management, because the greater the market control the more
ample the fruits to be shared through a system of vertical
cooperation.
The consequence of such cooperation from the viewpoint of the
public interest is, of course, another matter. In a prescient article
written in 1890, Alfred Marshall observed that traditionally the
public was protected by labor-management antagonism.9 Employers and employed "have seldom worked together systematically to
sacrifice the interests of the public to their own, by lessening the
supply of their services or goods, and thus raising their price artificially. But," Marshall added:
there are signs of a desire to arrange firm compacts between combinations
of employers on the one side and of employees on the other to restrict
production. Such compacts may become a grievous danger to the public
in those trades in which there is little effective competition from foreign
producers; a danger so great that if these compacts cannot be bent by publieopinion they may have to be broken up by public force.1 0

In short, the absence of effective competition in product markets,
when combined with vertical collusion between management and
labor-whether tacit or overt-poses a central problem for public
policy. Countervailing power is not a worthy substitute for antitrust policy, because countervailing power tends to be subverted
by coalescing power and thus makes the problem of controlling
market power more intractable than ever.
In this Article, we propose to test Galbraith's countervailing
power thesis by examining labor-management conduct in four different market situations. Two of our case studies will deal with
"regulated" industries and two with industries in the "private" sector. We shall demonstrate that in all four cases, coalescing power
rather than countervailing power is systematically created and
maintained; that this conduct constitutes a form of tacit vertical
collusion; that a central objective of this collusion is the suppression of competition in relevant product markets in order to immunize cost-price escalation by labor and management from an
autonomous, exogenous control mechanism; and that the result of
8. R. IUEFkNN, CARTELS, CONCERNS, AND TRUSTS 80 (1927).
9. MEMORIALS OF ALFRED MARSHALL (A.C. Pigou ed. 1956).

10. Id. at 288-89.
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the exercise of this coalescing power has been to fuel a pervasive
cost-price-cost spiral which has adversely affected macrostabilization policies in the United States-and, indeed, in the leading industrial nations of the western world.
II. THE REGULATED SECTOR
Governmental regulation of industry, as originally conceived,
was to be both a supplement to and substitute for competition. It
was to be applied in those industries where the cost of entry was
so great or the duplication of facilities so wasteful that some degree of monopoly was considered unavoidable. Here, the visible
hand of public regulation was to replace the invisible hand envisioned by Adam Smith in order to protect consumers against extortionate charges, restriction of output, deterioration of service,
and unfair discrimination. This was the rationale of the Interstate
Commerce Act of 1887.11
This regulatory concept, however, was first eroded and then extended. The regulatees themselves came to recognize that the better part of wisdom was not to abolish regulation but to utilize it.
Gradually, the public utility concept was transformed from consumer oriented, to industry oriented regulation. By a process so
brilliantly analyzed by Horace Gray,
the policy of state-created, state-protected monopoly became firmly established over a significant portion of the economy and became the keystone
of modern public utility regulation. Henceforth, the public utility status
was to be the haven of refuge for all aspiring monopolists who found it too
difficult, too costly, or too precarious to secure and maintain monopoly by
private action alone. Their future prosperity would be assured if only they
could induce government to grant them monopoly power and to protect
them against interlopers, provided always, of course, that government did
not exact 12too high a price for its favors in the form of restrictive
regulation.

Business interests gradually began to appreciate the virtues of
public utility status and to embrace government regulation as an
instrument of protection from competition. As early as 1892, five
years after Congress had passed the Interstate Commerce Act,
Richard Olney, a former director of several railroad companies and
U.S. Attorney General, stated the proregulation position with
Machiavellian clarity. In a letter to his old friend Charles E. Perkins, president of the Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad, who
had implored Olney to spearhead a drive to repeal the Interstate
Commerce Act, Olney wrote as follows:
11. Ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (1887) (discussed in W. ADAMs & H.M. GRAY, MONOPOLY
IN AMERICA 43-47 (1955)).

12. Gray, The Passingof the Public Utility Concept, 16 J. LAND &PuB. UTn. ECON.
8 (1940).
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My impression would be that looking at the matter from a railroad point of
view exclusively it would not be a wise thing to undertake .... The attempt would not be likely to succeed; if it did not succeed, and were made
on the ground of inefficiency and uselessness of the Commission, the result would very probably be giving it the power it now lacks. The Commission, as its functions have now been limited by the courts, is, or can be
made, of great use to the railroads. It satisfies the popular clamor for a
government supervision of the railroads, at the same time that that supervision is almost entirely nominal. Further, the older such a commission
gets to be, the more inclined it will be found to take the business and railroad view of things. It thus becomes a sort of barrier between the railroad
corporations and the people and a sort of protection against hasty and
crude legislation hostile to railroad interests .... The part of wisdom is
not to destroy the Commission, but to utilize it.13

By 1940, protectionism by regulation had become both a popular and respectable governmental control mechanism. Independent regulatory commissions had been entrusted with the oversight
of motor carriers, inland waterways, airlines, communications, and
natural gas - despite the fact that some of these industries hardly
conformed to the structural prototype of "natural" monopolies.
13. Letter from Richard Olney to Charles E. Perkins (Feb. 16, 1893) quoted in M.
JOSEPHSON, THE PoLrncos 526 (1938). Perceptive business leaders in the private sector also recognized that regulation was an admirable protectionist device which would guarantee an escape from competition. Thus, in 1911, when
the U.S. Steel Corporation came under antitrust attack, its president, Elbert
Gary, proposed governmental regulation of the industry as an alternative to
the cruelty of control by competition. In testimony before a congressional
committee, Judge Gary stated the case for regulation with undisguised
candor.
I realize as fully, I think, as this committee that it is very important to
consider how the people shall be protected against imposition or oppression as the possible result of great aggregations of capital,
whether in the possession of corporations or individuals. I believe
that is a very important question, and personally I believe that the
Sherman Act does not meet and will never fully prevent that. I believe we must come to enforced publicity and governmental control,
... even as to prices, and, so far as I am concerned, speaking for our
company, so far as I have the right, I would be very glad if we had
some place where we could go, to a responsible governmental authority, and say to them, "Here are our facts and figures, here is our property, here our cost of production; now you tell us what we have the
right to do and what prices we have right to charge." I know this is a
very extreme view, and I know that the railroads objected to it for a
long time; but whether the standpoint of making the most money is
concerned or not, whether it is the wise thing, I believe it is the necessary thing, and it seems to me corporations have no right to disregard these public questions and these public interests.
U.S. STEEL CORPORATION: HEARINGS BEFORE THE HOUSE COMM. ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE U.S. STEEL CORPORATION, Vol. 3, at 79 (1911).
"Your position [then]," said Congressman Littleton of the committee, "[is]
that cooperation is bound to take the place of competition and that cooperation requires strict governmental supervision?" Id.
"That is a very good statement," replied the judge. Id.
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"Public convenience and necessity," not the dictates of the competitive market, had become the standard for determining entry,
rates, and quality of service. Most important, this great transformation had been accomplished-not over the objection of business
interests, but with their approval and (sometimes enthusiastic)
support.14
Eventually, experience with regulation revealed what public interest advocates had long ago predicted. An accumulation of empirical evidence indicated that regulation in some industries was
not a device to protect consumers from exploitation but to protect
vested interests from competition. At the hands of some regulatory commissions, the power to license had become the power to
exclude; control over rates had turned into an instrument of price
supports; and authority over mergers had become a mechanism for
fostering industry concentration. 5 The regulatory commissions,
according to former chairman of the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC), Lewis Engman (a republican appointee serving during the
Nixon Administration), had transmuted the industries under their
jurisdiction into "federal protectorates, living in the cozy world of
cost-plus, safely protected from the ugly spectres of competition,
efficiency, and innovation."' 6 In short, under the aegis of the "independent" commissions, regulation was essentially a neo-mercantilist device of protectionism in which industry, labor, and
government regulators had an abiding interest-to the detriment
of the general public.
When these criticisms reached crescendo proportions, the drive
for deregulation- particularly, in airlines and trucking-gathered
force and became a palatable political issue both in the White
House and the Congress.' 7 Commissioners committed to administrative deregulation were appointed to the agencies, and deregulation bills found increasing support in Congress.' 8 And this set the
14. See, e.g., G. KoLKo, RAn.ROADS AND REGULATION: 1877-1916 (1965); G. KOLKO,
THE TRIUMPH OF CONSERVATISM (1963).

15. Adams, The Role of Competition in the Regulated Industries, 48 A. ECON. REV.
527 (1958). See also Schwartz, Legal Restriction of Competition in the Regulated Industries 67 HARv. L. REV. 436 (1954).
16. Address by L. Engman to the Financial Analysts Federation, in Detroit, Michigan (Oct. 7, 1974).
17. See, e.g., Federal Restraints on Competition in the Trucking Industry: Antitrust Immunity and Economic Regulations, Report of the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary,96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980) [hereinafter cited as Kennedy Report (1980)1; Civil Aeronautics Board Practices and Procedures: Report of
Subcomm. on Administrative Practicesand Procedureof the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary,94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) [hereinafter cited as Kennedy
Report (1975) 1.
18. See, e.g., Aviation Regulatory Reform: Hearingson H.R. 11,145 Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the House Comm. on Public Works and Transport,95th
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stage for the virulent opposition by business regulatees and organized labor to deregulation, demonstrating the operation of coalescing power and tacit vertical collusion chronicled in this section.
A.

Airlines

The Civil Aeronautics Act of 193819 was passed with the dual
objective of promoting the growth of aviation while maintaining
sufficiently low fares to allow the public access to air travel. The
newly created Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) was entrusted with
the regulation of the airline industry and equipped with three basic powers: (1) the entry power: the power to grant or to deny "certificates of public convenience and necessity," which an airline
would be required to obtain in order to fly interstate; (2) the rate
power: the authority to suspend or to set air fares; and (3) the antitrust power: the power to approve (or disapprove) agreements
among airlines, with approval conferring immunity from the antitrust laws.20 In addition, the Board was given certain subsidiary
powers, including the power to authorize mergers, the power to administer a subsidy, the power to regulate certain peripheral matters of airline service (e.g., baggage liability, tariff quotations,
2
discrimination), and the power to enforce its own regulations. 1
In practice, however, regulation did not prove to be a felicitous
experiment in economic statecraft and fell short of achieving the
ostensible objectives of the 1938 legislation. Thus, the Senate Subcommittee on Administrative Practices and Procedures found that,
under the CAB's control, "entry into the industry has been effectively blocked."22 According to the Committee:
The present 10 domestic trunk carriers directly descend from the 16 in

business in 1938; the nine existing local service carriers descend from 19
airlines allowed to provide local service directly after World War 11. No
new domestic trunkline has ever been authorized, and only one new localservice carrier has been authorized since 1950.23

Although the industry "is potentially highly competitive," the
Committee further found that:
[RJegulation discourages the airlines from competing in price and virtually forecloses new firms from entering the industry. The result is high
fares and security for existing firms. But the result does not mean high
profits. Instead the airlines-prevented from competing in price-simply
channel their competitive energies toward costlier service: more flights,
more planes, more frills. Thus, the skies are filled with gourmet meals and
Cong., 2d Sess. 122-86 (1978) (testimony of Alfred E. Kahn, Chairman, Civil
Aeronautics Board).
19. Ch. 601, 52 Stat. 973 (1938).
20. Kennedy Report (1975), supra note 17, at 2.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 6.

23. Id.
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Polynesian pubs; scheduled air service is frequent. Yet planes 2fly
across
4
the continent more than half empty. And fares are "sky high."

The Committee concluded that "Board regulation has not effectively brought about the low-fare service that is technically feasible and that consumers desire," that "[a]ir service can be made
available to the American public at significantly lower prices," and
that "[i] nereased competition is likely to bring about the provision
'25
of such service.
When a series of bills were introduced in the late 1970's to promote the public interest by deregulating the industry, airline management and organized labor launched a joint offensive to preserve
the regulatory status quo and its immunity from effective competition. Their remarkably parallel, multipronged attack on deregulation was a dramatic illustration of coalescing power in action.
1.

Deteriorationof Service for Smaller Communities

A major argument made by airline management and labor
against deregulation was that increased competition would cause
severe deterioration of air service to small- and medium-sized
communities across the country. They argued that with free entry
and exit, airlines would concentrate on the most densely travelled
(i.e., the most lucrative) routes between major metropolitan areas.
Competition in these corridors, in turn, would eliminate the excess
profits required to subsidize service to other smaller communities.
Thus, they argued, hundreds of communities would suffer from a
reduction in (or complete elimination of) air service along with an
increase in fares, thereby creating bleak prospects for further economic growth and development, given the importance of air service in modern society.
As uncontrolled, profit-maximizing carriers focused upon the
most lucrative, highest-density markets, Continental Airlines argued, their "marginal markets, namely shorter-haul and lowerdensity markets.., are bound to suffer."2 6 "In this trial by fire," a
United spokesman added, "the small cities and marginal segments
will be burned."27 Nor would the victims of the portended mael24. Id. at 3.
25. Id. at 19.
26. Aviation Regulatory Reform: Hearingson H.R. 8813 Before the Subcomm. on
Aviation of the House Comm. on Public Works and Transportation, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, 1835 (1977) (statement of Continental Airlines
presented by Lee M. Hydeman, Counsel) [hereinafter cited as Anderson
Hearings (1977) ].
27. Regulatory Reform in Air Transportatiom Hearingson S. 2551, S. 3364, and S.
3536 Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the Senate Comm. on Commerce,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 538 (1976) (statement of Edward E. Carlson, Chairman
and Chief Executive Officer, United Airlines) [hereinafter cited as Cannon
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strom be limited to the smallest communities: "Any legislation
that allows the more lucrative branches from the airline tree to be
snipped off," Mr. Borman argued on behalf of Eastern Airlines, "is
going to result in a severe impact on Nashville and Raleigh/Durham and in medium-sized cities in this country." 28 Speaking for all
major airline carriers, the Air Transport Association (ATA) concluded that only a handful of major cities would continue to be
served adequately. "Accordingly, the real choice to be made," the
ATA warned, "is between either a continuation of the extensive air
network we have today, with constantly improving service to all
segments of the public, or a concentration of operations in the high
density air markets, with an accompanying reduction of services to
29
the smaller, less productive markets."
Organized labor was in complete agreement with the position
taken by airline management. The Airline Pilots Association
argued:
It doesn't take much imagination to visualize what profit-oriented airline
managements would do in a liberalized entry environment. The opportunity to get into the more lucrative, high-population markets would be too
much for most airline marketing executives to resist ....
The unfortunate consequence of this development would be... a reduction or loss of
service now enjoyed by the smaller cities of America whose traffic-gener30
ating potential is limited ....
Hearings (1976)]. United subsequently reversed its position on this and
other points of opposition to deregulation by carriers. On the alleged small
city problems, for example, United later testified as follows:
Some have said that carriers will tend to reduce service to some
cities and shift airplanes to more lucrative markets. This argument
is also disproven by the facts. The levels of service provided under
current regulation to most communities is substantially above what
regulation requires. Most service is provided because it is profitable.
I can tell you that United Airlines will not reduce existing profitable
operations to gamble on proposed operations that might be profitable.
We believe that fears of abandonment are generally exaggerated.
Certainly, by way of comparision, existing law has not insulated
small cities. According to our data, 143 small cities have lost scheduled service since 1967.
Anderson Hearings (1977) supra note 26, 1364-66 (statement of Richard J.
Ferris, President, United Airlines).
28. Reform of the Economic Regulation of Air Carriers:HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Aviation of the House Comm. on Public Works and Transportation,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 486 (1976) (testimony of Frank Borman, President and
Chief Executive Officer, Eastern Airlines) [hereinafter cited as Anderson
Hearings (1976) ].
29. Cannon Hearings (1976) supra note 27, at 1009 (statement of Paul R. Ignatius,
President, Air Transport Association).
30. Remarks by J. O'Donnell, President, Air Line Pilots Association, before the
National Democratic Platform Committee 8 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Democratic Platform Address].
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The Airline Clerks concurred: "It is obvious that airlines will have
to concentrate on the major population centers in order to survive.
If they direct their resources to these population centers, smaller
communities which are not profitable will eventually be dropped
or at the least, service to those cities will be greatly curtailed." 31
Similarly, the Executive Council of the AFL-CIO concluded that
32
deregulation would "threaten air service to many smaller cities."
Ultimately, as the Air Transport Association argued, the deregulation of air service would discourage economic development of
small- and medium-sized communities while limiting the access of
residents in these areas to the world.33 The Airline Pilots concurred: "A city in today's world without adequate air service is in
the same dire shape as one without rail service 50 years ago. It is
34
isolated and dying."
2. Competition Would Be Wasteful and Inefficient
A second line of attack on deregulation was that it would encourage wasteful excess capacity and fuel consumption as more
carriers competed for the same traffic. Paradoxically, management
and labor argued, deregulation would result in highernot
lower-fares. In making this argument, each group impugned the
relevance of intrastateairfares, which are considered to be beyond
the reach of CAB authority and which are thirty-five to fifty percent lower than regulated fares on comparable interstate flights, as
an index of "reasonableness."
"In our view," said a spokesman for Continental Airlines,
merely letting existing carriers roam freely in the market place is likely to
lead to wasteful competition, since we believe that new entry will be in
medium-haul, high-density markets already well served and that new entry in those markets will simply result in unneeded capacity at times of
day duplicating existing service ....
[SI uch excess capacity is bound to
31. Regulatory Reform in Air Transportation: Hearings on S. 292 and S. 689
Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science,
and Transportation,95th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 3, 1324 (1977) (statement of Allen W. McCauley, Director, Air Transport Division, Brotherhood of Airline
Clerks) [hereinafter cited as CannonHearings (1977) 1.
32. Id. at 1322 (statement of AFL-CIO Executive Council).
33. Cannon Hearings (1976), supra note 27, at 1014 (statement of Paul P, Ignatius, President, Air Transport Association). See also Oversight of Civil Aeronautics Board Practices and Procedures: HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on
Administrative Practiceand Procedureof the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
94th Cong., 1st Sess. 585 (1975) (prepared statement of Harvey J. Wexler, Senior Vice President, Continental Airlines) [hereinafter cited as Kennedy
Hearings (1975) ].
34. DemocraticPlatform Address, supra note 30, at 8. See also Cannon Hearings
(1976), supra note 27, at 1271 (statement of Francis A. O'Connell, Legislative
Director, Transport Workers Union).
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be counterproductive.

prices.

35

It will lead to pressure for higher, not lower,

Or, as a TWA representative put it, "[t] he more competition that
exists, the more capacity is brought into the market to slice the pie
into smaller pieces. ' 36 Equally wasteful, according to Braniff,
would be the impact upon fuel consumption: "If you are for free
entry to add more airlines, you have to disregard fuel conservation.
Fuel consumption will soar as more airlines burn up the skies
fighting for shares of the existing travel market." 37
Likewise, labor spokesmen testified that "it is almost certain
that load factors will not be increased to any significant extent;" 38
therefore, "wasteful excess capacity in major air travel markets"
would be a likely consequence of free entry.3 9 Also, the Airline
Clerks asked, "how can we in good conscience propose legislation
of this type which would promote additional consumption of precious energy [?] "40
Both groups attacked the relevance of significantly lower fares
charged by intrastate carriers free of CAB regulation as indicative
of the likely effects of nationwide deregulation. The Air Transport
Association claimed the intrastate and interstate systems to be
"fundamentally different" and, therefore, incomparable on a
number of grounds: intrastate carriers frequently operate under
monopoly conditions; intrastate carriers concentrate on high density routes; California and Texas are uniquely blessed with
favorable weather conditions; short hauls permit fewer cabin
amenities and thus more seating; costly overnight crew arrangements are avoided; ticketing, reservation and baggage handling are
simplified; and maximum utilization of equipment is possible. 41
Similarly, a union spokesman argued that intrastate conditions
35. Anderson Hearings (1977), supra note 26, at 1835 (statement of Continental
Airlines presented by Lee M. Hydeman, Counsel).
36. Cannon Hearings (1976), supra note 27, at 658 (statement of Charles C. Tillinghast, Jr., Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Trans World Airlines).
"If you want to get low fares," Mr. Maytag, the president of National Airlines,
remarked, "the ideal way to do it is have one airline and you can schedule
perfectly for the whole United States. You can schedule for peak periods.
You can fill your airplanes up. Schedule them for the proper times. Please
don't understand that Iam suggesting this kind of thing," he hastened to add.
Cannon Hearings (1977), supra note 31, at 1224.
37. Cannon Hearings (1977), supra note 31, at 1216 (statement of Harding L. Lawrence, Chairman and President, Braniff Airways).
38. Cannon Hearings (1976), supra note 27, at 839 (statement of John J.
O'Donnell, President, Air Line Pilots Association).
39. Anderson Hearings (1977), supra note 26, at 1584 (statement of John J.
O'Donnell, President, Air Line Pilots Association International).
40. Cannon Hearings (1977), supra note 31, pt. 3, at 1325 (statement of Allen W.
McCauley, Director, Air Transport Division, Brotherhood of Airline Clerks).
41. Cannon Hearings (1976), supra note 27, at 1011-12 (statement of Paul R. Ignatius, Air Transport Association).
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"are not and cannot be duplicated" in interstate markets owing to
unique circumstances. 42
3. Industry Chaos
A third argument against deregulation was that it would usher
in a state of abject chaos. Absent the stability of route and rate
regulations, labor and management argued, the frequency, price,
and availability of service would fluctuate violently and
unpredictably.
Would the country be prepared, the president of TWA asked
rhetorically, "for the rise and fall of airline prices, depending on
variances in supply/demand relationships at different times in various markets?" 43 "The public," according to Continental Airlines,
"would be left with great uncertainty as to the availability of air
service by any particular carrier or in any given market."44 In
short, Continental concluded, "[t]he situation for the travelling
public and shippers is likely to be chaotic." 45
Spokesmen for organized labor agreed with the assessment
made by Continental. The Transport Workers Union, for example,
warned of the widespread confusion that would follow in the advent of governmental deregulation: "Fares will fluctuate wildly,
schedules can and will be altered on whim or with changing demand, thereby stranding business passengers and shippers' goods.
Airline flight crews will not know one day to the next when they
will fly, to where and for whom."46 The Machinists were content in
their testimony to rely upon remarks by management that deregu42. Id. at 838 (statement of John J. O'Donnell, President, Air Line Pilots Association International); Anderson Hearings (1977), supra note 26, at 1572 (statement of William G. Mahoney, Counsel for Brotherhood of Railway and
Airline Clerks, International Association of Machinists, and Transport Workers Union); id., pt. 1, at 334 (testimony of William Scheri, Assistant General
Chairman, International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers).
In reaching these conclusions, labor groups unabashedly relied, inter alia,
on discussions with and the testimony of airline management. Thus, Mr.
Scheri, speaking for the Machinists, rested his conclusions in this regard on
talks with his colleagues "plus many management people across this country." Id. The airlines pilots' representative, Mr. O'Donnell, cited analyses of
intrastate carriers conducted and presented by Continental and Texas International. Cannon Hearings (1976), supra note 27, at 840.
43. Cannon Hearings (1976), supra note 27, at 661 (statement of Charles C. Tillinghast, Jr., Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Trans World Airlines).
44. Id. at 442 (statement of Robert F. Six, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer,
Continental Airlines).
45. Kennedy Hearings (1975), supra note 33, at 585 (statement of Harvey J. Wexler). See also Cannon Hearings (1976), supra note 27, at 1015 (statement of
Paul R. Ignatius, President, Air Transport Association).
46. Cannon Hearings (1976), supra note 27, at 1271 (statement of Francis A.
O'Connell, Legislative Director, Transport Workers Union).
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lation would be tantamount to "anarchy" and would cause "chaos
instead of an orderly system of air service,"4 7 while the Airline Pilots Association warned that regulatory control "is the glue which
holds the network of interconnecting air transport services together so it can function in the public interest." 48
4. Predation,Concentration,and Control
A fourth argument against deregulation was that it would permit the largest airlines to predatorily price other carriers out of the
industry. This, it was claimed, would lead to increased concentration and control in the hands of a few, powerful firms which would
then be able to raise rates. The paradox, management and labor
once again argued, was that deregulation would result in less competition, higher fares, and would eventually lead to demands for
re-regulation--or worse, nationalization-of the industry.
"In my view," the president of one carrier testified, "freedom of
entry, exit and pricing would enable the major carriers to dominate
all of the larger lucrative air transportation markets. Their substantially greater capital resources alone would bring this about in
the absence of the route protection afforded by the existing certificate of public convenience and necessity."49 "If you eliminate differences between airlines in routes and prices as well as
equipment," according to another airline president, "then marketing success becomes a simple question of size. The small airlines
will not have the market identity, route strength and financial
power. I repeat marketing success will simply become a function
of size." 50 Not only is aviation "a highly predatory business," a
spokesman for Western Airlines testified, it is surrounded by "a
group of predatory opportunists." 51 Another carrier saw concentration evolving from mergers between carriers:
The efficient medium-sized trunk and regional carriers will be stripped
of all security in the markets they have developed and serve. They will be
forced to merge with the larger carriers on terms dictated by the giants.
As a result, within a few years, the United States will have fewer
47. Anderson Hearings (1977), supra note 26, pt. 1, at 1017 (testimony of Louis
Schroeder, Assistant General Chairman, District Lodge 141, International Association of Machinists).
48. Id. at 1584 (statement of John J. O'Donnell, President, Air Line Pilots Association International).
49. Cannon Hearings (1976), supra note 27, at 792 (statement of Edwin I.
Colodny, President and Chief Executive Officer, Allegheny Airlines).
50. Anderson Hearings (1977), supra note 26, at 1636 (statement of Harding L.
Lawrence, Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer, Braniff

Airways).
51. Cannon Hearings (1977), supra note 31, pt. 2, at 533-34 (testimony of Arthur F.
Kelly, Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer, Western Airlines).
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trunklines than today. Those carriers will be so large and powerful that
they will each dominate certain U.S. markets.
Rather than creating a more competitive and healthy environment, this
legislation will produce a climate designed to favor big airlines. The disappearance of smaller carriers-considered to be the
industry's most effi52
cient-will only lead to increasing concentration.

Inexorably, then, carriers argued that deregulation would eventually lead to a "weak 'controlled' competition that usually goes with
oligopoly resulting in less emphasis on service and low fares," 53 an
increased "[a]bility of a few airlines to dictate the timing and direction of new aircraft technology resulting in a tendency to limit
technological innovation," 54 "higher fares and less service," 55 and,
again paradoxically, the need "for more regulation, rather than
5
less." 6

Representatives of organized labor foresaw the same serious
oligopolistic consequences. The AFL-CIO, for example, warned
57
that deregulation would "encourage cut-throat pricing practices."
And, like their managerial counterparts, union spokesmen argued
that any reduction in fares following deregulation would be a temporary phenomenon and a prelude to increased concentration.5 8
One labor representative cited the remarks of the former president
of United Airlines that "[aifter the dust settled, the big carriers
would be bigger and the little carriers absent." 59 The Machinists
52. Id. pt. 3, at 1220 (statement of L.B. Maytag, Chairman of the Board and Chief
Executive Officer, National Airlines).
53. Id. pt. 2, at 1013 (statement of Francisco A. Lorenzo, Chairman, Association of
Local Transport Airlines, and President, Texas International Airlines).
54. Id.
55. Cannon Hearings (1976), supra note 27, at 437 (statement of Robert F. Six,
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Continental Airlines).
56. CannonHearings (1977), supra note 31, pt. 1, at 472 (statement of C.E. Meyer,
Jr., President and Chief Executive Officer, Trans World Airlines). See also
Cannon Hearings (1976) supra note 27, at 661 (statement of Charles C. Tillinghast, Jr., Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Trans World Airlines).
57. Cannon Hearings (1977), supra note 31, at 1322 (statement by AFL-CIO Executive Council).
58. Democratic Platform Address, supra note 30, at 9.
59. Anderson Hearings (1977), supra note 26, pt. 1, at 1017 (statement of Louis
Schroeder, Assistant General Chairman, District Lodge 141, International Association of Machinists). Labor's reliance on United's initial position proved
premature when the carrier subsequently recanted:
Could [deregulation] lead to concentration or domination by United
or any other carrier? There is little evidence of economy of scale in
U.S. air transportation. Smaller trunks - and widely recognized intrastate commuters - have efficiencies and marketing skills. Nimble
and smart smaller carriers could really do well in this new
environment.
Id. pt. 2, at 1364 (statement of Richard J. Ferris, President, United Airlines).
United's "about-face" drew the following response from the vice president of
TWA, W.D. Slattery-
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predicted that the eventual result of deregulation would be "anywhere in the neighborhood of two to three, at the most four, carriers left in the United States," "a monopolistic airline system
unable and unwilling to meet the public need or convenience," and
"the Federal Government being compelled to nationalize the
industry".6o
5. Inability to Obtain Capital
A fifth line of attack against deregulation was that it would cripple the industry's ability to obtain capital. The security of protected route certificates, labor and management contended, was
crucial to the airlines' ability to raise funds on favorable 'terms.
Absent such security, the industry would be unable to obtain
needed capital in private markets. Hence, deregulation could well
lead to increased dependence upon the public sector and, in the
extreme, to nationalization.
"The foundation of the financial credit of the airlines," National
Airlines warned, "has been the route certificate system. If you remove this credit keystone, the enormous financial resources
needed by the airlines will be diverted to better risks."61 "If we
impair the value of [route certificates] in an industry which is cyclical by nature," United Airlines claimed early in the hearings, "we
will create a high degree of risk for financial institutions which
could bring new investment in the industry to a halt."62 The evenWe have heard testimony and apparently this is to ease the minds
of those who are against deregulation, that there are certain airlines
who have come out for deregulation, and indeed United Airlines has
testified in favor of deregulation.
I would suggest that if General Motors were in favor of some
change in the automotive industry, every other automotive company
were against it, we would not find the Government so widely behind
that particular act. I think the fact that United Airlines is the largest
airline in the industry, in fact the GM of the airline industry, the fact
that they are for it should raise caution in everyone's mind.
Id. pt. 1, at 308. Labor, of course, immediately took up the shibboleth. As one
spokesman for the Machinists stated:
[O]ut of all the carriers there is only one carrier, to my knowledge,
that is backing deregulation, and that is United Airlines. And, like
Mr. Slattery said, from TWA, beware if United Airlines is backing it.
And I have to agree with that statement, even though I represent the
people on that carrier.
Id. at 335 (testimony of William Scheri, Assistant General Chairman, International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers).
60. Anderson Hearings (1977), supra note 26, pt. 1, at 330-31 (testimony of William Scheri, Assistant General Chairman, International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers).
61. Id. pt. 2, at 2055 (testimony of E.F. Dolanskey, President and Chief Operating
Officer, National Airlines).
62. Cannon Hearings (1976), supra note 27, at 535 (statement of Edward E. Carl-
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tual outcome, according to Eastern Airlines, would find carriers in63
creasingly dependent upon the public sector, i.e., nationalization.
Labor's position on this issue closely tracked that taken by
management. "Free entry and exit," the Airline Pilots Association
warned, "would have a serious adverse effect on the ability of the
industry to attract capital necessary to finance the development of
new technology . .."64 "New equipment and new technology," as
a spokesman for the Airline Clerks explained, "require steady, reliable sources of capital .... To introduce the insecurity of unregulated competition into this equation would cause our sources of
son, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, United Airlines). Upon reflection, however, United concluded that the adverse effects of continued
regulation outweighed any negative impact of deregulation:
Industry profits experienced over the past 20 years are no longer
adequate to keep the system going. For almost two years, United's
senior officers have engaged in painstaking examination and discussion of this paramount issue. We have attempted, to the best of our
ability, to find a solution within the limits of present regulation. My
competent associates, who built this large and respected airline,
could find only partial remedies among all the options available today. Our examination showed us many avenues that are available to
managements of other American firms to restore adequate earnings
levels. Since these solutions are not open to us under current regulation, we began to consider regulatory change as the instrument to
improve the outlook for our customers, our shareholders and our employees.
What is wrong with present regulations? In our view, it is the way
our regulators have handled the two key questions of pricing and entry. Under existing regulation there is no . . . reasonable prospect
that earnings could improve to the point where carriers can earn a
rate of return that will restore the credit of our industry and enable it
to attract much needed capital.
Anderson Hearings (1977), supra note 26, at 1362 (statement of Richard J.
Ferris, President, United Airlines).
63. Cannon Hearings (1976), supra note 27, at 598 (statement of Frank Borman,
President and Chief Executive Officer, Eastern Air Lines). Alternatively,
Delta argued that oligopolistic concentration would result from the uncertainty of deregulation and its impact on the supply of capital:
If airline routes were insecure, either in the sense that the airline
were not obligated as it is today by the certificate to serve the routes
over which its operations have been found to be needed or, even
more importantly, in the sense that the degree of expected competition were largely unpredictable, the airline business would be highly
insecure. Ipsofacto, the sources of borrowed funds would dry up for
all but the few very strongest carriers. This is but one of many ways
in which any significant weakening of the certificate process would
foster a drive toward concentration of the industry in the hands of
only a few, large, strong air carriers-the very antithesis of what the
reformers ostensibly seek.
Cannon Hearings (1977), supra note 31, pt. 2, at 895 (statement of R.S. Maurer, Senior Vice President and General Counsel, Delta Airlines).
64. Cannon Hearings (1976), supra note 27, at 840 (statement of John J.
O'Donnell, President, Air Line Pilots Association).
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badly needed funds to disappear .... ,6 Like management, labor
portrayed the eventual outcome as an "airline system resembling
that of Europe where carriers are owned by the central governbe the first
ments." 66 "Deregulation", in other words, "could well
67
step toward nationalization of the airline industry."
6.

Threat to Labor

Management and labor also opposed deregulation on the
grounds that it would directly and severely harm labor. The
threat, both groups warned, was two-fold: (1) a massive dislocation and unemployment of relatively immobile employees as
routes between smaller communities across the country were
eliminated; and (2) the gains of organized labor would be seriously
undermined as new, low-cost, nonunionized carriers entered the
industry.
The president of Eastern Airlines warned that "thousands of
jobs are at stake." 68 Similarly, a TWA spokesman feared a "severe" impact upon the industry's 300,000 employees and pointedly
noted what he interpreted as "the contradiction of espousing fuller
jeopemployment while supporting measures that would seriously
69
ardize countless highly skilled jobs in a vital industry." Particularly significant, according to one carrier, was the immobility of
labor.
A large proportion of the jobs in our industry are associated with a high
degree of specialized skill, acquired through complex training and long experience. The possibility of retraining workers with these skills for emis minimal. In any
ployment at a comparable level in other industries
70
meaningful sense, their career would be at an end.
65. Cannon Hearings (1977), supra note 31, pt. 4, at 1908 (statement of Ronald H.
Stout, System Board 451, Brotherhood of Airline Clerks).
66. Anderson Hearings (1977), supra note 26, pt. 1, at 329 (statement of William
Scheri, Assistant General Chairman, International Association of
Machinists).
67. Id. See also Cannon Hearings (1976), supra note 27, at 1271 (statement of
Francis A. O'Connell, Legislative Director, Transport Workers Union).
68. Anderson Hearings (1976), supra note 28, at 455 (statement of Frank
Borman).
69. Cannon Hearings (1977), supra note 31, pt. 1, at 468, 471 (statement of C.E.
Meyer, Jr., President and Chief Executive Officer, Trans World Airlines).
.70. Id. at 468. See also CannonHearings (1976), supra note 27,at 1014 (statement
of Paul R. Ignatius, President, Air Transport Association). Here, too, United
subsequently reversed course:
Abandonment has also been equated with job loss and is loosely
used as an argument against regulatory reform. Here, again, we find
that the argument has no merit, and the facts demonstrate otherwise.
Under the Federal Aviation Act and existing regulation our certificated industry has been shrinking, not growing. There are now almost 10,000 fewer jobs than there were in 1969. Under those
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Deregulation, management representatives foreboded, constituted
a mortal challenge to the very existence of organized labor and the
gains it had painstakingly made in the past. Said the president and
chairman of the board of American Airlines: "The pending proposals would encourage the organization of new airlines free from
many of the constraints contained in current airlines collective
bargaining agreements. The proposals thus threaten the job security of thousands of airline employees." 7 ' The president and chief
operating officer of National Airlines agreed that "[1]egislative
72
changes would thereby revoke union gains made over the years,"
and the president of Texas International Airlines asserted that deregulation "would be an attack on the labor movement in this
73
country."
Labor, of course, concurred with management's assessment.
"[A] irline deregulation," the Teamsters warned, "will lead to longterm unemployment, employee dislocation and hardship, lower
wages, reduced benefits and poorer working conditions for those
workers lucky enough to retain their jobs in the air transportation
industry."74 The Machinists were convinced that deregulation
would "throw thousands of skilled and dedicated workers out on
the streets. ' 75 "As a result of rate wars that would rage in an atmosphere of unrestricted competition," the Airline Clerks concluded, "there would be fewer airlines surviving and fewer airline
members." 76 And, like the presidents of air carriers, labor spokesmen feared a direct threat to their organizations:
[Deregulation] would involve the very real threat of lower wages and reduced earnings potential as some carriers would eventually be replaced
by new or unorganized carriers who by the payment of substandard wages
and benefits and poorer service would
. .. [wipe] out the gains gained
77
over many years by union members.

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

circumstances we find it difficult to understand how an expansionary
bill would result in job loss in a business which has already shrunk!
Anderson Hearings (1977), supra note 26, at 1366 (statement of Richard J.
Ferris, President, United Airlines).
Cannon Hearings (1977), supra note 31, at 1396 (statement of Albert V.
Casey).
Anderson Hearings (1977), supra note 26, at 2054 (testimony of E.F.
Dolanskey).
Cannon Hearings (1976), supra note 27, at 510 (statement of Francisco A.
Lorenzo).
Cannon Hearings (1977), supra note 31, pt. 2, at 711 (statement of Frank E.
Fitzsimmons, General President, Brotherhood of Teamsters).
Id. at 1324 (statement of John F. Peterpaul, General Vice President, International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers).
Id. at 1325 (statement of Allen W. McCauley, Director, Air Transport Division,
Brotherhood of Airline Clerks).
Id. at 1324-25 (statement of Allen W. McCauley, Director, Air Transport Division, Brotherhood of Airline Clerks). See also id. at 1333 (statement of John
J. O'Donnell, President, Air Line Pilots Association).

19831

VERTICAL COLLUSION

7. Adverse Impact Upon Related Industries
Management and labor further attacked deregulation on the
grounds that it would adversely affect such related fields as aircraft
manufacturing and airport construction, operation, and financing.
The financial health of these industries, management and labor
claimed, depended on the financial well-being of the airline industry. The instability and financial uncertainty generated by deregulation of airlines, they argued, would undermine the economic
viability of aircraft production and airport operations.
"A healthy airline industry is absolutely essential to the aircraft
airframe and engine manufacturers," TWA asserted, "[a]nd these
manufacturers are absolutely essential to our basic economy and
to our national defense." 78 -United, prior to reversing its position
on deregulation, stated:
Today United is working closely with Boeing and United Aircraft in the
design specifications of a new version of the highly successful 727 jet, the
dash 300, which promises greater fuel efficiency and quieter operations both clearly in the interest of airline passengers and communities. Who
would afford the sort of long range study effort and massive capital commitment associated with this sort of activity if the air transportation industry is placed in a highly uncertain transitional posture by
deregulation? Would aerospace manufacturers invest in R&D efforts to
79
sell to a fragmented and unstable market?

The effect on employment would be disastrous, the carriers contended. "[W] hat happens," the president of TWA agonized, "to the
hundreds of thousands of employees who are involved in supporting the airline industry in the production of aircraft and related
equipment if the industry cannot attract the capital
necessary[?]80
Labor spokesmen also pointed to the allegedly severe consequences for aircraft manufacturers. Deregulation of air transport
service would "discourage modernization of aging airline fleets"
according to the Executive Council of the AFL-CIO.81 The Transport Workers Union also warned that "aircraft development and
manufacturing will be seriously hampered by lack of funding." 82
"Not only is [impaired capital raising ability] an unfortunate situation for the airlines who must begin now to plan for future equipment," the Airline Pilots concluded, "it also threatens aeronautical
78. Cannon Hearings (1976), supra note 27, at 663 (statement of Charles C. Tillinghast, Jr., Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Trans World Airlines).
79. Kennedy Hearings (1975), supra note 33, at 633 (prepared statement of Andrew De Voursney, United Airlines).
80. Cannon Hearings (1977), supra note 31, pt. 1, at 468 (statement of C.E. Meyer,
Jr.).
81. Id. pt. 3, at 1322.
82. Id. at 1326 (statement of Francis A. O'Connell, Legislative Director, Transport
Workers Union).

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62:621

research and development of new technology aircraft and
83
engines."
Air carriers and labor pointed to airport construction and improvement as another field whose economic viability would be
jeopardized by the elimination of route certification and control.
An American Airlines spokesman explained:
Most runway and terminal improvements are financed through the sale of
airport revenue bonds. Long-term airline commitments set forth in airport use agreements and terminal leases provide the basis under which
cities issues [sic] these securities.
With the uncertainties created by deregulation, airlines will be less
willing to make these long-term commitments, since they will be unable to
forecast whether and
to what extent they will still be operating by long84
term commitments.

Deregulation, Delta predicted, would "disrupt current and committed airport financing," "precipitate a series of financial crises for
cities," and "make it virtually impossible to finance airport im85
provements and future development."
Union representatives also focused on the perilous consequences for airport construction and improvement. "Planning for
airport improvements and development," the Airline Pilots Association argued, "would be significantly disrupted. Airport operators
rely heavily on long term commitments from the airlines to underwrite the financing of terminal and other related development.
The uncertainties posed by the liberal entry and exit provisions of
the various deregulation bills would discourage airlines from entering into extended contractual arrangements." 86 The AFL-CIO's
Executive Council stated that airport construction and improvements would be "jeopardized," 87 while the Transport Workers
Union contended that free entry and exit would "all but destroy
airport management's ability to plan and finance their facilities. 88
8.

Threat to Safety

Management and labor also jointly fought deregulation on the
grounds that it would threaten the safety of the flying public. Both
claimed that competition would pressure carriers-particularly
new entrants-to cut corners on safety. Although routes and fares,
83. Democratic Platform Address, supra note 30, at 11.
84. Cannon Hearings (1976), supra note 27, at 521 (statement of Albert V. Casey,
Chairman and President, American Airlines).
85. Id. at 699 (statement of R.S. Maurer, Senior Vice President, General Counsel
and Secretary, Delta Airlines).
86. Id. at 840 (statement of John J. O'Donnell, President, Air Line Pilots
Association).
87. Cannon Hearings (1977), supra note 31, at 1322.
88. Id. at 1326 (statement of Francis A. O'Connell, Legislative Director, Transport
Workers Union).
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on the one hand, and safety, on the other, traditionally have been
regulated by different government agencies, carriers and unions
agreed that economic and safety regulations were inseparable.
Western Airlines, for example, testified that "those who live on
the fringe of the business will always have a tendency to cut corners" with regard to safety.89 United Airlines initially warned that
"marginal, or cutrate, operators may be tempted to cut corners on
safety when under economic pressure." 90
Graphic treatment of the issue, however, was left to labor. As
the Airlines Pilots Association warned:
[N]ew entrepreneurs, anxious to be successful in the airlines business,
would not have the commitment or the financial resources to achieve the
margin of safety which must be maintained in today's sophisticated air
transport environment. The FAA, with its limited resources, would be
hard pressed to handle their certification, monitoring and enforcement responsibilities to insure compliance by new operators in a manner consistent with the traveling public's expectations. 91

Other labor groups were less restrained. The Machinists
claimed 92 that "Fly-by-night airlines will become a reality," while
the Transport Workers Union castigated deregulation as "a cruel
93
experiment with passenger safety."
89. Id. pt. 2, at 550 (statement of Arthur F. Kelly, Chairman and Chief Executive
Officer, Western Airlines).
90. Kennedy Hearings (1975), supra note 33, at 632 (statement of Andrew De
Voursney, United Airlines). Two years later, however, United reversed its
stance on the safety issue:
United doesn't share these concerns. We do not believe that regulatory reform will create an environment in which carriers will shave
costs by compromising safety. If the dynamics of the market place
cause some carriers to decline or fail, we do not believe that maintenance or safety will be compromised from existing standards. In
past periods of economic difficulties, safety was not compromised.
There is simply no evidence that carrier management or the FAA has
in the past or will in the future hold safety hostage to economics.
New carriers, managed by people found to be fit, willing and able
to participate in air transportation, should pose no threat to safety.
These firms will typically employ experienced airline operating employees. They will be subject to all safety rules and regulations of
the act as administered by FAA.
Anderson Hearings (1977), supra note 26, at 1368-69 (statement of Richard J.
Ferris, President, United Airlines).
91. Anderson Hearings (1977), supra note 26, at 1586 (statement of John J.
O'Donnell, President, Air Line Pilots Association International).
92. Id. pt. 1, at 406 (testimony of Edward Imondi, Legislative Committee, International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers).
93. Id. pt. 2, at 1579 (statement of Francis A. O'Connell, Legislative Director,
Transport Workers Union). See also id. at 1573 (statement of William G. Mahoney, Counsel, Brotherhood of Railway and Airline Clerks, International
Association of Machinists, and Transport Workers Union); Cannon Hearings
(1977), supra note 31, pt. 2, at 711 (statement of Frank E. Fitzsimmons, Gen-
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9. FavorableEvaluation of Performance Under Regulation
Finally, management and labor attacked deregulation legislation on the grounds that the industry had performed admirably
under CAB regulation. To support their argument, management
and labor compared the secular trend of airfares with that of consumer prices generally; compared airfares for equivalent routes in
the United States and abroad; and pointed to discount fares as evidence of effective price competition. They concluded that regulatory theory and legislation were sound; whatever problems
remained were merely those of administrative fine-tuning.
Eastern Airlines, for example, argued that average revenues
per *airpassenger mile increased 37 percent from 1950 to 1975, while
the consumer price index rose 73 percent over the same period.9 4
In like vein, a spokesman for the Machinists pointed to a 24 percent increase in airfares between 1948 and 1977 as compared with a
146 percent rise in the consumer price index.9 5
Representatives of both groups presented similar comparisons
of United States and foreign airfares. The president of American
Airlines testified that "U.S. airfares are also a bargain when compared with fares elsewhere in the world. For example, a ticket between Dallas and Detroit costs $94 (including a $7 tax), while the
fare between London and Lisbon, a comparable distance, is about
$165."96 A spokesman for the Transport Workers Union agreed:
"We also have the lowest domestic fares when compared with for'97
eign fares.
As evidence of effective competition, management and labor
alike cited the availability of discount fares in the industry. According to Delta:
An extensive assortment of excursion fares, military discounts, and the
like are also offered by the scheduled carriers, as are a selection of charter
fares. This form of airline price competition has led to hundreds of varying combinations of fares offered by different carriers, with pricing differences based on such factors
as time of day, season of the year, length of
98
stay, and length of haul.

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

eral President, Brotherhood of Teamsters); id. pt. 3, at 1322 (statement by
AFL-CIO Executive Council).
Cannon Hearings (1976), supra note 27, at 590 (testimony of Frank Borman
President and Chief Executive Officer, Eastern Airlines).
Anderson Hearings (1977), supra note 26, pt. 1, at 332 (testimony of William
Scheri, Assistant General Chairman, International Association of Machinists
and Aerospace Workers).
Cannon Hearings (1976), supra note 27, at 517 (statement of Albert V.
Casey).
Id. at 1272 (statement of Francis A. O'Connell, Legislative Director, Transport
Workers Union).
Id. at 694 (statement of R.S. Maurer, Senior Vice President and General
Counsel, Delta Airlines).
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Likewise, the Airline Pilots Association argued that "deregulators
refuse to take account of the wide range of discount fares which
the airlines now offer to the price-sensitive air traveler."99
Finally, management and labor (with the eventual exception of
United) agreed in their assessment of the overall soundness of the
legislation under which the industry had been regulated. An Eastern spokesman, for example, concluded that "we have a good system that needs to be improved, not a bad system that needs to be
abandoned."10 0 Labor agreed. "[T]he problem," according to the
Airlines Pilots Association, "does not lie with the Federal Aviation
Act, but rather with the administration of that law."101 Or, as a
spokesman for the Machinists put it:
I know that we have all, including labor, complained about the CAB and
other regulatory reforms in the agency, and the carriers [have] likewise.

But I would suggest that we also complain about our relatives, mothers-ina new
law and what not, but we don't intend to throw them away to get
10 2
one, we just suggest that they correct some of their own faults.

10. Summary: Airlines
Having beneficially accommodated itself to a cost-plus climate
of governmentally-created and governmentally-enforced cartelism,
vertical power thus coalesced in tacitly collusive fashion so as to
shield itself from deregulation and competitive encroachment. The
arguments relied upon by management and organized labor in this
collective effort were strikingly, if not suspiciously parallel, and at
times well-nigh indistinguishable.
Despite labor-management's protestations, the Airline Deregulation Act--calling for phased reductions of CAB control over
routes, rates, entry, mergers, and, indeed, for the "sunsetting" of
the CAB itself-was enacted in 1978.103 Given the severe economic
recession which set in shortly thereafter, it is difficult, as the General Accounting Office has recently concluded, "to judge the industry's performance under deregulation until it has had more
operating experience."1 0 4 For their part, carriers have since agreed
99. Id. at 841 (statement of John J. O'Donnell, President, Air Line Pilots
Association).
100. Cannon Hearings (1977), supra note 31, pt. 2, at 819 (statement of Frank Borman, President and Chief Executive Officer, Eastern Airlines). See also id. at
881 (statement of R.S. Maurer, Senior Vice President and General Counsel,

Delta Airlines).
101. Id. pt. 3, at 1335 (statement of John J. O'Donnell, President, Air Line Pilots
Association).

102. Id. pt. 4, at 1843-44 (statement of Charles Easley, President and District
Chairman, Lodge No. 143, International Association of Machinists).

103. Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (1978).
104. U.S. GENERAL AcCOUNTING OFCE, THE CHANGING AIRLINE INDusTRY: A STATUs REPORT THROUGH 1980 at 1 (1981).
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that the Deregulation Act has enabled them "to more effectively
react and to better manage their resources in these extremely difficult circumstances." 10 5 Indeed, management's recent effort to repeal labor protection provisions in the Deregulation Act, and
organized labor's opposition to such attempts, appears of late to
have driven a wedge between these two power blocs. 0 6 However,
as our discussion of trucking infra will demonstrate, facile conclusions as to the fragility of coalescing vertical power and its impotence in the face of legislative deregulation may be fraught with
premature optimism.
B.

Trucking

Regulation of the interstate trucking industry by the Interstate
Commerce Commission (ICC) commenced in 1935 with passage of
the Motor Carrier Act.107 The ostensible goals were three-fold: (1)
to promote safe, adequate, economical and efficient transportation;
(2) to encourage sound economic conditions in transportation; and
(3) to encourage reasonable rates without unreasonable discrimination or unfair destructive competition practices. 0 8 As would be
the case in airlines, entry into trucking and the number of rivals
105. Effects of Airline Deregulationand Legislationto Advance the Datefor Sunset
of the Civil Aeronautics Board: Hearings on H.R. 4065 Before the Subcomm.
on Aviation of the House Comm. on Public Works and Transportation,97th
Cong., 1st Sess. 189 (1981) (statement of Paul R. Ignatius, President, Air
Transport Association).
106. Cf. id. at 222-24 (statement of Paul R. Ignatius, President, Air Transport Association); id. at 657-70 (testimony of Linda Puchala, President, Association of
Flight Attendants); id. at 701-10 (joint statement of Brotherhood of Airline
Clerks, Flight Engineers' International Association, International Association
of Machinists, and Transport Workers Union); id. at 711-19 (statement of Air
Line Pilots Association).
107. Ch. 498, 49 Stat. 543 (1935).
108. These objectives became part of "The National Transportation Policy" stated
in the Transportation Act of 1940:
It is hereby declared to be the national transportation policy of the
Congress to provide for fair and impartial regulation of all modes of
transportation subject to the provisions of this Act, so administered
as to recognize and preserve the inherent advantages of each; to promote safe, adequate, economical, and efficient service and foster
sound economic conditions in transportation and among the several
carriers; to encourage the establishment and maintenance of reasonable charges for transportation services without unjust discriminations, undue preferences or advantages, or unfair or destructive
competitive practices; to cooperate with the several States and the
duly authorized officials thereof; and to encourage fair wages and equitable working conditions; -all to the end of developing, coordinating, and preserving a national transportation system by water,
highway, and rail, as well as other means, adequate to meet the
needs of the commerce of the United States, of the Postal Service
and of the national defense. All of the provisions of this Act shall be
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were controlled through certificates of operating authority issued
by the Commission. Similarly, the Commission was empowered to
control rates charged by regulated trucking firms. The rates
presented for Commission review, however, were collectively arrived at between carriers acting in collegial fashion through rate
bureaus- i.e., "trade associations of regulated carriers"' 0 9 exempt
from antitrust prosecution.
As proved to be the case in the airline industry, regulation of
trucking in practice promoted the private interests of established
and entrenched carriers rather than the public interest in efficient
and economical transportation service. According to Professor
Machlup, 'The results of the restriction of entry and the regulation
of rates in the trucking industry have been to reduce the number
of trucking firms; to encourage the growth of larger size firms; to
facilitate, nay, render necessary, collusive trade association activity, especially with regard to rate making; to restrict independent
action on the part of smaller truckers; and to increase the level of
rates."1 1 0 "In this field," he concluded, "it is public policy to restrain competition, to suppress it through thorough-going regulation by government agencies and private associations."''
Triggered by widespread criticism of what came to be considered a governmentally-created and governmentally-sanctioned
cartel, a series of Congressional hearings were begun in the late
1970's to consider deregulation of the industry. These hearings
provided a forum in which management and organized labor
mounted their collective assault on deregulation in a joint effort to
preserve and protect the regulatory status quo. Their arguments
administered and enforced with a view to carrying out the above declaration of policy.
Transportation Act ch. 722, 54 Stat. 899 (1940) (quoted in D. PEGRUM, PUBLIC
REGULATION OF BUSwiESS 603 (rev. ed. 1965)).
109. Kennedy Report (1980), supra note 17, at xvi. This report noted that
The ICC made virtually no effort to examine rate bureau operations
until 1972, some 24 years after passage of the Reed-Bulwinkle Act. In
that year, and later in 1976, the Commission examined the operating
practices of a total of six general freight rate bureaus. Though limited
in scope, these inquiries nonetheless revealed serious violations of
the ratemaking agreements on the part of several of the bureaus.
The results of these preliminary inquiries, together with congressional pressure for increased ICC scrutiny of rate bureau activities,
led to the institution of a formal investigation of rate bureaus. This
proceeding resulted in several procedural changes in rate bureau operations; but the Commission also concluded that antitrust immunity
for collective ratemaking activities continued to be warranted.
Id. at xxii.
110. F. MAcHLuP, THE PorrrcAL ECONOMY OF MONOPOLY 298 (1952).
111. Id. at 299.
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were strikingly similar to those used earlier by their counterparts
in the airline industry.
1.

Deteriorationof Service for Smaller Communities

Paralleling management and labor attacks on the deregulation
of airlines, a major argument raised by management and organized
labor against deregulation of the trucking industry was that it
would decimate service to small- and medium-sized communities
across the nation. Certificates of operating authority, both groups
asserted, entailed a public responsibility to serve all areas regardless of their relative profitability, while high-density, high-profit
routes provided the revenues necessary to underwrite less profitable service to small communities. With free entry and exit, management and labor argued, entrants would concentrate on the most
lucrative routes, rates on these routes would decline, but carriers
would be both unable and unwilling to subsidize service to small
communities. Thus, service to the latter would be severely curtailed while rates would rise. As was the case with airlines, both
groups pointed out the unfavorable consequences that such deterioration of service allegedly would work upon the economic viability of hundreds of afflicted communities.
"The carefully structured and controlled evolution of the cost of
motor freight transportation," Interstate Motor Freight System argued, "has encouraged and helped foster the ability of every hamlet and every metropolis to reach the total markets of this
country."" 2 Specifically, the industry's trade group, the American
Trucking Associations (ATA), explained:
Today's regulated for-hire motor carrier is carrying the full burden of
the growing volume of small shipments. He is also the only transportation
service available for many thousands of small communities that are now
completely dependent upon truck transportation.
These operations, frequently consisting of small shipments to off-line
points, are not the most profitable. In many cases, the traffic is marginal.
But the carrier is able to maintain this service, and carry out the full obligations of his authority, because he can balance the less desirable operations with the more profitable traffic moving between major traffic
1 13
centers.

Without entry controls, Briggs Transportation Company warned:
112. Oversight of Freight Rate Competition in the Motor CarrierIndustry: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st and 2d Sess., vol. 1, 165 (1978) (prepared statement of James T. Hite, III, Chief Executive Officer) [hereinafter cited as Kennedy Hearings].
113. Economic Regulation of the Trucking Industry: Hearingon S. 1400 and S. 2245
Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,96th
Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, 209 (1979) (statement of American Trucking Associations) [hereinafter cited as Cannon Hearings].
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The larger companies would drop hundreds and thousands of the smaller
communities if they had to be out there in the total free marketplace to try
to support the profitability of their companies.
Right now, it is a part of a system, and they recognize their common
carrier responsibility or their contract carrier responsibility, whichever it
may be, in that this is part of what makes the system work. If it is all out
in the free marketplace, you can bet your bottom dollar that they are not
going to look twice
at those little places that do not produce a profit on that
1 14
particular stop.

Heavily, if not exclusively, dependent upon motor freight service,
regulated carriers conthe "primary casualties" of deregulation,
5
cluded, "would be small communities.""
Labor spokesmen closed ranks behind management's argument
that small and intermediate communities would be the main victims of deregulation. "In recent months," the president of the
Teamsters, Mr. Fitzsimmons, explained to Congress:
[T]he Interstate Commerce Commission has administratively debased
the value of adequate service in the area of entry. As a result, the quality
and quantity of service provided by common carriers have been adversely
affected. If a balanced approach to entry is not restored by Congress,
smaller cities, towns and communities and shippers will not receive the
service on which they have relied in the past. If Congress fails to include a
meaningful entry requirement, economic self-restraint will force carriers
to concentrate on transportation between the large city pairs where the
greatest equipment utilization and balanced movements can be obtained.
Much of the service presently provided to intermediate communities
116
would be dropped because it is either unprofitable or less profitable.

Higher transport rates, both management and labor predicted,
would accompany the deterioration of service to thousands of afflicted communities. "Small communities," an official of the Wilson Trucking Company warned, "will have to bear a higher burden
of transportation costs to replace revenues depleted by cutthroat
competition in major traffic lanes."" 7 Thus, not only would smalltown service be curtailed, according to the American Trucking As114. Examining CurrentConditionsin the Trucking Industry and the Possible Necessity For Change in the Manner and Scope of Its Regulations: Hearingson
H.R. 6418 and Related Bills Before the Subcomm. on Surface Transportation
of the House Comm. on Public Works and Transportation, 96th Cong., 2d
Sess., pt. 3, 626 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Howard Hearings]. See also Cannon Hearings, supra note 113, at 210 (statement of American Trucking
Associations).
115. Cannon Hearings,supra: note 113, at 218 (statement of American Trucking
Associations). See also Kennedy Hearings,supra note 112, at 248 (prepared
statement of Samuel G. Herold, Executive Vice President, Middle Atlantic
Conference).
116. Howard Hearings, supra note 114, at 762-63. See also Cannon Hearings,
supra note 113, pt. 5, at 1621-28 (statement of James Jesinski, SecretaryTreasurer, Local No. 200, Brotherhood of Teamsters).
117. Kennedy Hearings,supra note 112, at 167 (prepared statement of William J.
Jones, Vice President, Wilson Trucking Co.). See also id. at 165 (prepared
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sociations, "even that service which is still available would certainly be at a higher rate than today."" 8 Again, organized labor's
position tracked that of management. "Even degraded service to
small- and medium-sized communities," one Teamster spokesman
argued, "would become far more expensive in the absence of effective [i.e., restrictive] entry provisions."119 "If the medium- and
small-size cities are to receive any service at all," the Machinists
echoed, "it will be presented to them at almost prohibitive
20
rates."'1
In addition, management and labor made a concerted effort to
point out the broader economic significance of these portended developments. An official of Pacific Intermountain Express, for example, warned that deregulation would "further aggravate the
competitive disadvantages of... small communities,"121 while a
vice president of Consolidated F'reightways remarked that "[t] he
small producer or manufacturer who located his plant in a rural
area, in reliance upon the availability of regulated truck service
and a stable uniform rate structure, will not be comforted to know
that the loss of transportation service which forces him out of business is a 'benefit of competition.' "122 Similarly, the Teamsters emphasized that "[s]hippers in the intermediate cities would be at a
disadvantage competing with those located in the large metropolitan areas,"' 123 while the Machinists, representing "tens of
thousands of employees working in small manufacturing industries in rural areas that are highly dependent upon regulated carriers to move their products," warned that these jobs "could be
seriously affected should deregulation result in loss of trucking for
their particular communities."124
2. Competition Would be Wasteful and Inefficient
A second argument made by both groups in their attack on de-

118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

statement of James T. Hite, Chief Executive Officer, Interstate Motor Freight
System).
Cannon Hearings,supra note 113, at 100 (testimony of Bennett C. Whitlock,
Jr., President, American Trucking Associations).
Id. pt. 5, at 1621 (statement of James J. Jesinski, Secretary-Treasurer, Local
No. 200, Brotherhood of Teamsters).
Id. pt. 1, at 244 (statement of John F. Peterpaul, Vice President, Transportation, International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers).
Kennedy Hearings,supra note 112, vol. 3, at 1465 (prepared statement of John
G. Christy, President, IU International).
Id. at 162 (statement of Gene T. West, Vice President, Traffic, Consolidated
Freightways).
Cannon Hearings,supra note 113, pt. 5, at 1621 (statement of James Jesinski,
Secretary-Treasurer, Local No. 200, Brotherhood of Teamsters).
Id. at 1556 (statement of Andrew Kenopensky, National Automotive Coordinator, International Association of Machinists).
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regulation was the contention that competition would be wasteful
and inefficient. In this, management and labor agreed with one another as well as with their colleagues in the airline industry. The
argument comprised two elements. First, free entry, it was alleged, would merely lead to wasteful excess capacity and fuel consumption as more carriers competed to haul a fixed volume of
traffic. Second, concentration of entry in the most lucrative routes
would destroy the efficiencies of balanced freight hauling which
management and labor claimed to have been engineered into the
industry by the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC). Ironically, they concluded, competition would impair-not promoteeconomic efficiency.
"Unlike potential volumes of passenger traffic," the American
Trucking Associations (ATA) opined:
Freight traffic is a pie of relatively fixed dimensions. Its size is controlled
by the general level of the economy and not by the number of people willing to carry freight. The market for transportation is a derived demand.
Carriers do
not create freight. They can only carry what the economy
125
produces.

The ATA continued:
The elimination of entry controls and the ensuing entry into the industry
of thousands of new truck operations, the need for which had not been
established through application of the test of "public convenience and necessity" would create excess capacity. The
inevitable result would be a
126
marked increase in empty truck mileage.

Moreover, Mr. Herold, speaking for the Middle Atlantic rate conference, stated: "[I]f entry was free to anyone.., then the full service carriers who are trying to provide a full transportation service
to all points in the country are going to have less traffic to handle
and they are going to have higher costs and, therefore, higher
rates."127 The outcome, according to the testimony of carrier representatives, would be "wasted mileage coming from too many
trucks chasing a limited amount of traffic,"' 28 presenting "the real
danger of excess capacity with resulting inefficiencies, particularly
29
in fuel usage."1

Organized labor's position on this point was, at times, virtually
indistinguishable from that of management. "The volume of traffic
to be moved by motor carriers is relatively stable," a Teamster
spokesman claimed, "and, even if the rates were lowered, the vol125. Id. pt. 1, at 209 (statement of American Trucking Associations).
126. Id. at 218.
127. Kennedy Hearings,supra note 112, at 222.
128. Cannon Hearings, supra note 113, at 218 (statement of American Trucking

Associations).
129. Id. pt. 5, at 1806 (statement of American Trucking Associations).
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ume would not increase appreciably."' 30 "Because everybody and
his brother is going to buy a truck," another Teamster testified,
131
"there will be more trucks running empty than Carter has pills."'
The adverse effect of free entry upon the alleged balance of freight
movement accomplished under regulation-an effect cited by management-was also emphasized by Teamster president
Fitzsimmons:
Permitting the non-regulated carriers who do not have the obligation to
serve all shippers and all communities, large or small, to take selected
backhauls of commodities would disrupt the balanced movements that the
carregulated carriers have laboriously achieved, thereby making for-hire
13 2
rier service less efficient and more costly to the general public.

"And, in an energy-starved Nation," another labor spokesman
pointed out:
[D]eregulation would put thousands more trucks, all burning critically
short fuel, out on the road chasing the same amount of freight and greatly
increasing the empty truck miles. With the problems this Nation is going
short energy supto have in meeting our basic needs with 13increasingly
3
plies, the logic of that totally escapes me.

Thus, organized labor agreed with management that "[e]mpty
mileage would increase, equipment would be underutilized and
our scarce supllies of fuel would be wasted."134
3. Industry Chaos
Management and labor further argued that deregulation of
trucking would usher in confusion and chaos. While the details
varied, the thrust of the argument was once again remarkably similar to that utilized by airline carriers and unions. Rate bureaus
and the ICC, it was claimed, jointly functioned as a clearinghouse
in which rates were distilled into uniform, comprehensible categories which were stable and predictable. By eliminating this machinery, deregulation would result in a bewildering array of
billions of individually-determined rates which would fluctuate
wildly and unpredictably while generating blizzards of paperwork.
Moreover, joint routes and rates between interconnecting carriers
would disappear, and rate discrimination would become ram130. Id. pt. 1, at 120 (statement of Frank E. Fitzsimmons, General President,
Brotherhood of Teamsters).
131. Id. pt. 2, at 525 (testimony of Joe Pellicciotti, Secretary-Treasurer, Local No.
667, Brotherhood of Teamsters).
132. Howard Hearings,supra note 114, at 761.
133. Cannon Hearings, supra note 113, pt. 2, at 520 (statement of Walter Shea,
Administrative Assistant to the General President, Brotherhood of
Teamsters).
134. HowardHearings,supra note 114, at 761 (statement of Frank E. Fitzsimmons,
General President, Brotherhood of Teamsters).
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pant-with large, powerful shippers able to wrest more favorable
rates from carriers.
"The collective ratemaking process and the rate bureaus," Interstate Motor Freight System argued, "maintains and organizes in
a structured and intelligent manner rate information that is a multiple of thousands of carriers, tens of thousands of geographic
points, and literally billions of individual rates."' 35 "Collective
ratemaking," the American Trucking 13Associations
added, "is the
6
glue that holds the system together."'
Removal of this ratemaking function through deregulation, carriers argued, would result in an astronomical and intractably complex number of individual rates. "Without collective ratemaking,"
the Middle Atlantic rate bureau claimed, "we would soon have a
fragmented hodge-podge: Countless thousands upon thousands of
endless combinations of rates. A shipper-carrier headache. A consumer nightmare."' 37 Elimination of rate regulation, then, "Would
create, without question, discriminatory chaos that would upset
38
the shipping costs and retail pricing structure of the Nation"'
while simultaneously placing "an impossible burden upon carriers
and shippers to try to keep [rates] current, particularly on small
carriers and shippers."139 Moreover, any degree of regulatory
oversight would be impossible. "Finally, and perhaps most significant of all," the H & W Motor Express Company concluded in this
respect,
without bureau collective ratemaking, the ICC and state regulatory agencies would be swamped by a flood of paper-hundreds of filings for every
one received now. The regulatory agencies, without staff additions many
times greater than they can reasonably be expected to receive, simply
could not cope with this situation.1 4 0

The carriers predicted that unpredictable variability of rates in
an unregulated environment would compound their sheer multiplicity. "With price competition as the only criterion," according to
one carrier, "the fluidity of rates would be governed solely by the
135. Kennedy Hearings,supra note 112, at 164 (statement of James T. Hite, Chief
Executive Officer, Interstate Motor Freight System).
136. Cannon Hearings,supra note 113, at 98 (testimony of Bennett C. Whitlock,
Jr., President, American Trucking Associations).
137. Kennedy Hearings, supra note 112, at 250 (statement of Samuel G. Herold,
Executive Vice President, Middle Atlantic Conference). See also id. at 244
(statement of James C. Harkins, Executive Director, National Motor Freight
Traffic Associations).
138. Id. at 152 (testimony of James T. Hite, Chief Executive Officer, Interstate Motor Freight System).
139. Cannon Hearings, supra note 113, pt. 2, at 673 (statement of M.J. Petrina,
Auto Transporters Tariff Bureau).
140. Id. at 653 (statement of Urban R. Haas, President, H & W Motor Express Co.)
(quoting Professor Roy J. Sampson).
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auction block of expedience, and uncontrolled opportunistic price
changes will result not only in a deterioration of service, but will
effectively destroy any semblance of rate stability."14] According
to the American Trucking Associations, there "would be such a
high degree of uncertainty that businesses, small and large, would
be severely hindered in the efficient planning, purchasing and marketing of goods."'14 2
Management cited joint through-route services provided by,
and collectively arrived at between, carriers as a further victim of
deregulation. "As a general proposition," Consolidated Freightways claimed,
joint through routes would most likely cease to exist, and shippers requiring joint service to accomplish needed transportation would have to work
out their arrangements with the separate carriers and move their shipments at combinations of the carriers' separate rates. There could be no
such thing as a fair, nondiscriminatory, nonpreferential rate structure
under which shippers could receive equal treatment in the transportation
of their supplies, materials, goods and products, and there would be no
means by which the motor carriers could maintain143the voluntary, integrated system of transportation which exists today.

Organized labor concurred with the carriers, albeit in summary
fashion. "With widely fluctuating shipping rates," one Teamster
asked, "would consumer prices fluctuate-or would they be 'stabilized' at a level high enough to hedge against fluctuations?"144 Generally, however, the union was content to defer to management.
"Because of the complexity of the industry," Teamster president
Fitzsimmons stated laconically, "we believe collective rate making
should be allowed with respect to all rates.'U45
Compounding these chaotic effects, management and labor
warned, would be the inequitable impact upon small shippers and
producers, for the latter would be unable to obtain the rate reductions that larger shippers could command in a deregulated environment. "Every shipper," a spokesman for the H & W Motor
Express Company claimed,
seeks every advantage which it can get in its competitive marketplace. To
the extent that its size and market position permits it to exert strong economic pressure upon a carrier in order to secure a better deal on transportation every shipper exercises its power.
141. Kennedy Hearings, supra note 112, at 171 (prepared statement of Gerald
Cole, Senior Vice President, Cole's Express).
142. Cannon Hearings, supra note 113, at 214 (statement of American Trucking
Associations). See also Kennedy Hearings,supra note 112, at 260 (statement
of Samuel G. Herold, Executive Vice President, Middle Atlantic Conference).
143. Kennedy Hearings,supra note 112, at 161 (statement of Gene T. West, Vice
President, Traffic, Consolidated Freightways Corp.).
144. Howard Hearings,supra note 114, pt. 1, at 148 (statement of Edward R. Toliver, Coordinator, Joint Council 3, Teamsters).
145. Id. pt. 3, at 769.
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One of the fundamental purposes of transportation regulation is to try
to neutralize that power among shippers to protect the opportunity for the
small businesses to compete with the giants. The provision in the present
system of collective ratemaking for secret ballots on rate proposals is in
direct furtherance of that purpose of regulation. Public disclosures of carrier votes will inevitably result in a restoration to large shippers of the
power to force carriers to give them unjustified rate treatment. In today's
diversified, complex economy, the resultant effect of favoritism and rate
discrimination, would be to further narrow the ability of small- and medium-sized enterprises to continue in competition with industrial
giants.146

"Under collective ratemaking," the American Trucking Associations added, "the larger shipper is no better off than the small."147
Hence, one effect of deregulation (including removal of the antitrust immunity applied to collective ratemaking), an ATA spokesman concluded, would be a rate structure that discriminated
against the small producer and shipper. 4 8 Indeed, he suggested
that such an outcome was a prime motive underlying the support
by powerful shippers for the deregulation movement.149
Organized labor joined with management in this line of defense
of the status quo. Rate regulation, the Teamsters argued, "provides
carriers with a certain amount of protection from their customers'
large shippers"; thus, "[w]ithout collective ratemaking, many carriers would be at the mercy of large shippers."' 5 o Like management, labor spokesmen alluded to the alleged anticompetitive
advantages which would accrue to large shippers: "They will get
their lower rates. But the poor small shipper that is dependent
upon the regulated carrier, he will not get his service-he will not
get his commodities shipped because he can't get a carrier to do
it.,,151
4. Predation,Concentration, and Control
A fourth argument against deregulation, also voiced by the
management and labor of airlines, was that freedom of pricing
would permit the largest carriers to drive others from the field,
thereby resulting in increased concentration and control. The surviving oligopolists would then wield sufficient market power to
146. Cannon Hearings,supra note 113, pt. 2, at 645 (statement of Urban R. Haas,
President, H & W Motor Express Co.).
147. Id. pt. 1, at 212 (statement of American Trucking Associations).
148. Id. pt. 2, at 495-96 (statement of James C. McCormick, American Trucking
Associations).
149. HowardHearings,supra note 114, pt. 3, at 626 (testimony of C. James McCormick Senior Vice President, Briggs Transportation Co.).
150. Kennedy Hearings,supra note 112, at 181 (statement of Robert Schlieve, Secretary-Treasurer, Local 563, Brotherhood of Teamsters).
151. Cannon Hearings,supra note 113, pt. 2, at 526 (testimony of Joe Burkhard,
Eastern Conference of Teamsters).
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raise rates. Paradoxically, management and labor agreed, deregulation of trucking would result in less-not more-competition and
higher-not lower-rates.
The American Trucking Associations argued that regulation
preserved-not eliminated--competition in the industry:
There are 16,600 ICC-regulated motor carriers. Of these, 12,453 gross
$500,000 or less. Deregulation would promote concentration not competition. In the regulated motor carrier industry, the top four carriers account
for 10 percent of the total revenues; the top eight, 14 percent. Compare
this with other American industries, industries which are "regulated" by
the general antitrust laws which deregulationists advocate as better152regulators of the trucking industry than the Interstate Commerce Act.

Consolidated Freightways, one of the largest carriers in the nation,
expressed solicitude for the fate of its smaller rivals:
[Riepeal of collective ratemaking would not mean the demise of CF. We
would survive. But small companies would not. Were carriers unable to
cooperate with one another in making rates, were it a case of every man
for himself and the devil take the hindmost, the small carriers would go
the way of small businesses, such as the "mom and pop" grocery stores,
which do not have153the resources to wage full scale economic warfare
against the giants.

The representative of one carrier rate bureau warned that concentration would follow a short-term period of predatory pricing:
"Without regulation, I believe one could anticipate the following
scenario [:1 . .. predatory pricing which will eliminate the smaller
and weaker carriers, resulting in a high degree of concentration."' 54 "As weaker carriers are killed off," according to Mr. Jones
of the Wilson Trucking Company, "there will be less restraint on
rates in major traffic lanes, allowing rates to begin moving upward." 55 Thus, the American Trucking Associations concluded
that "following the misleading attempt to get more competition, we
will begin to get less and less."156
Organized labor embraced management's stance on this issue.
The Machinists, for example, framed the argument against deregulation in terms virtually identical to those of management. Like
company spokesmen, they drew comparisons with the structure of
the automobile industry:
We will jeopardize more smaller carriers. The American Trucking Association testified that there were 16,000 regulated carriers in America. Statistically, 80 percent are under half a million dollars. We are not talking
152. Id. pt. 1, at 104 (statement of Bennett C. Whitlock, Jr., President, American
Trucking Associations).
153. Kennedy Hearings,supra note 112, at 162 (statement of Gene T. West, Vice
President, Traffic, Consolidated Freightways Corp.).
154. Id. at 248 (statement of Samuel G. Herold, Executive Vice President, Middle
Atlantic Conference).
155. Id. at 167.
156. Id. vol. 3, at 1516 (statement of American Trucking Associations).
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about large corporations. One of our concerns is that if we open up this
regulation and ratemaking and so on, I am convinced that the larger ones
are going to survive. Temporarily they will reduce prices just to put the
smaller carriers out of business. When they eliminate their competition,
to.7 Look at the auto industry. How
they can charge whatever they want 15
much competition do we have there?

competition flourish
"How," as one Teamster exclaimed, "will
58
when most of the competitors are gone!"1
5. Inability to Obtain Capital
Management and organized labor further attacked deregulation
on the grounds that it would severely damage the industry's ability
to obtain the capital needed for investment and growth. A mirror
image of the argument against airline deregulation, each power
bloc claimed that regulatory protection provided the requisite security necessary to attract capital on favorable terms. Absent such
protection, the industry would be unable to obtain adequate funding, its financial viability would deteriorate, and it could well be
forced to turn to public subsidies or, worse, public ownership.
"Deregulation," the American Trucking Associations claimed,
would have an adverse effect on the financial condition of the industry and
its ability to attract the capital necessary for future growth. Modern motor
carrier transportation is much more than a truck on the road with a driver
behind the wheel. It is a complex business involving the latest business
techniques and most modern types of equipment. The industry has generally been able to attract investment on an equal basis with other major
industries. Uncertainty as to the industry's future, however, because of
deregulation, would cause equity financing to become less attractive.
There would be greater reliance on debt financing, and this would be at
much higher levels, and not competitive with that provided other
15 9
industries.

Again, labor concurred: "Present efficient and well-managed
carriers," the Teamsters asserted, "would have their earnings so
reduced as a result of loss of backhauls and the cutthroat competition of independent owner-operators who would flood onto the
highways that they would be unable to earn adequate profits, to
157. Howard Hearings, supra note 114, pt. 3, at 1241 (testimony of Andrew Kenopensky, National Automotive Coordinator, International Association of
Machinists).
158. Id. pt. 1, at 147 (statement of Edward R. Toliver, Coordinator, Joint Council 3,
Teamsters). See also id. pt. 3, at 763 (statement of Frank E. Fitzsimmons,
General President, Brotherhood of Teamsters).
159. Cannon Hearings, supra note 113, at 221 (statement of American Trucking
Associations). See also Kennedy Hearings, supra note 112, vol. 3, at 1531
(statement of American Trucking Associations).
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attract capital and to pay fair wages and maintain good working
conditions."160
Escalating the rhetoric, carriers and labor alike raised the specter of nationalization. "(T) he motor carrier industry," according to
the American Trucking Associations,
is dedicated to the concept that the country needs and should have a privately-owned transportation system .... Other nations throughout the
world have nationalized, or semi-nationalized, their systems. Regulation
priin the public interest has not been tried in these countries; instead,
16 1
vate ownership has been abandoned in favor of nationalization.

The Teamsters were more abrupt: "The movement toward nationalization of the surface transportation industry would be advanced
62
by deregulation of truckload traffic."1
6. Threat to Labor
Trucking deregulation was also fought on the grounds that it
would result in a deterioration of wages and working conditions.
Regulated collective rate control, it was claimed, served as a shield
permitting organized labor to bargain for reasonable pay and work
standards. Elimination of this protective umbrella under deregulation would adversely affect labor because competition would force
carriers to reduce their expenses by lowering their labor costs.
An officer of one of the largest carriers, Consolidated Freightways, for example, worried whether free entry would "encourage
fair wages and equitable working conditions." 63 The Teamsters
were not in doubt, said Teamster president Fitzsimmons: "What
we are saying, and what we have been saying to deregulation is
this: Unless there is some form of rate regulation, our members in
the trucking industry will not have the opportunity to bargain for
decent wages, hours and working conditions."164 In such a situation, he added, "newly-formed non-union carriers would have a
substantial advantage over union carriers and fair wages would become a thing of the past."165 Hence, the Teamsters were "committed to retaining a regulated motor carrier industry because without
160. Howard Hearings,supra note 114, pt. 3, at 761-62 (statement of Frank E. Fitzsimmons, General President, Brotherhood of Teamsters).
161. Kennedy Hearings,supra note 112, vol. 3, at 1528-29 (statement of American
Trucking Associations).
162. Howard Hearings,supra note 114, pt. 2, at 51 (statement of Frank E. Fitzsimmons, General President, Brotherhood of Teamsters).
163. Kennedy Hearings,supra note 112, vol. 3, at 1464 (statement of Gene T. West,
Senior Vice President, Consolidated Freightways Corp.).
164. Id. vol. 1, at 184. See also id. at 181 (statement of Robert Schlieve, SecretaryTreasurer, Local 563, Brotherhood of Teamsters); Cannon Hearings, supra
note 113, pt. 4, at 1229 (statement of Chuck Mack, Secretary-Treasurer, Local
70, Brotherhood of Teamsters).
165. Cannon Hearings,supra note 113, pt. 5, at 1850 (statement of Frank E. Fitzsimmons, General President, Brotherhood of Teamsters).
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such regulation our members, over a period of time, would be re1 66
duced to working for minimum wages.
Z

Adverse Impact Upon Related Industries

Surprisingly, a seventh line of attack taken by management and
labor against deregulation was that it would hasten the demise of
an already weak rival - the railroad industry. Here, both groups
demonstrated the same concern for a related industry which their
counterparts had shown in arguing against airline deregulation.
"Deregulation of the motor carrier industry," the American
Trucking Associations warned,
would have repercussions in transportation far beyond the obvious effect
on the motor common carrier and the services to small shippers and small
communities.
There is convincing evidence that, faced with hordes of individual truck
operators free to pick and choose the most profitable truckload traffic at
rates below those which existing carriers, rail or motor, could meet, the
railroads could easily be in a far worse financial condition than that which
prompted passage of the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform
Act of 1976.167

The Teamsters followed management's lead:
As everyone knows, rail rates already are depressed and many railroads
are either in bankruptcy or subsidized by the Federal Government. If
cutthroat competition would take
there is deregulation of truckload1traffic,
68
further traffic from the railroads.

8. Threat to Safety
Deregulation was also attacked on the grounds that it would
pose a serious threat to the safety of both truck drivers and the
motoring public. The threat of revoking route certificates, it was
claimed, provided the only effective means for enforcing safety
standards. Deregulation and the elimination of such certificates
would remove this "handle" for safety enforcement, while competition would pressure companies and workers alike to cut corners
recklessly. As was asserted by the airlines in their fight against
deregulation, the management and labor of the trucking industry
argued that deregulation would jeopardize public safety.
"Highway safety," an American Trucking Associations representative explained, "has always been a matter of prime concern in
166. Kennedy Hearings,supra note 112, at 181 (statement of Robert Schlieve, Secretary-Treasurer, Local 563, Brotherhood of Teamsters).
167. Id. vol. 3, at 1526-27 (statement of American Trucking Associations).
168. Cannon Hearings, supra note 113, pt. 2, at 521 (statement of Walter Shea,
Administrative Assistant to the General President, Brotherhood of
Teamsters).
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motor carrier operations. The regulated industry takes pride in its
16 9
highway safety record and its efforts to improve this record."'
"But ... deregulation," the ATA's spokesman, Mr. Whitlock, emphasized, "would mean that anybody, anybody, could go out and
buy a truck and get on the highway."lo This could have frightening results:
The motor carrier who is the prime violator of safety regulations and who
has denounced the 55 m.p.h. limit, as well as present hours-of-service requirements, is the type that would be unleashed upon the public highways
if we had deregulation. There would be no effective safety enforcement.
He would have no operating authority to revoke for consistent violations
and the depressed rate structure under which he would operate would not
permit the type of effective safety
programs that have become the hall17 1
mark of the regulated carrier.

"Highway safety," the president of Southeastern Freight Lines
concluded, "will be one of the first casualties if entry controls are
72
eliminated."1
In broad outline, organized labor's position on the safety issue
was indistinguishable from that adopted by management. "Union
drivers and regulated companies have a better [safety] record,"
the Teamsters argued, "primarily because the regulated carriers
must maintain good safety records in order to obtain additional operating authority from the Commission or, for that matter, to preserve the authority they already possess."

7 3

The Machinists

added that "regulated carriers are also required by present law to
keep maintenance records, conduct safety inspections on vehicles,
required [sic] driver 'vehicle condition reports' daily and many
other safety related activities which non-regulated carriers are not
required to perform.' 7 4 Labor representatives described the adverse consequences of deregulation with respect to safety:
We cannot be cavalier about highway safety and methods other than deregulation for achieving it. Tens of thousands of our members face the
possibility of having to get up one morning and drive an 18 wheel rig over a
highway newly flooded by deregulation with drivers who either don't care
169. Id. pt. 1, at 219-20 (statement of American Trucking Associations).
170. Id. at 101 (testimony of Bennett C. Whitlock, Jr., President, American Trucking Associations).
171. Kennedy Hearings,supra note 112, vol. 3, at 1521-22 (statement of American
Trucking Associations).
172. Id. at 1459 (statement of W.T. Cassels, Jr.), See also Howard Hearings,supra
note 114, at 622 (testimony of C. James McCormick, Senior Vice President,
Briggs Transportation Co.).
173. Cannon Hearings,supra note 113, pt. 1, at 119 (statement of Frank E. Fitzsimmons, General President, Brotherhood of Teamsters).
174. Id. at 244 (statement of John F. Peterpaul, Vice President, Transportation,
International Association of Machinists).
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by economic necessity to violate the Federal and State safety
or are 17driven
5
rules.

Another Teamster warned of the effect "of flooding highways with
tens of thousands of independent truckers, responsible to no one,
and under extreme economic pressure to disregard highway speed
limits and hours of service regulations.' ' 7 6 Mr. Jesinski, also
speaking for the Teamsters, alleged that deregulation, and its attendant competitive pressures "to us means loss of jobs, loss of life
or serious injury."? 7 The risk, Teamster president Fitzsimmons
concluded, "is so great that deregulation by legislation should be
rejected and 8deregulation by administrative action should be
7
rolled back."'
9. FavorableEvaluation of Performance Under Regulation
Finally both groups argued-as did their counterparts in the
airlines industry-that the industry had performed admirably
under regulation. Management and labor agreed that the trucking
industry was vigorously competitive both between and within the
various modes of transportation; that the option of independently
filing rates assured price competition despite the existence of collective ratemaking bureaus; that the trend of motor carrier rates
compared favorably with broader price indices; that shippers were
satisfied with the service they received; that shippers participated
in the collective ratemaking process; and that claims of wasteful
empty mileage due to regulation were distorted. Deregulation, in
short, was quite unnecessary.
"There is an abundance of competition in transportation," Mr.
West of Consolidated Freightways stated, offering as evidence the
rivalry "between modes of carriage, between types of carriers
within the motor carrier industry, and between carriers of the
same type.' u7 9 "We have the force of private carriage," the American Trucking Associations added, arguing that "that in itself is an
economic break on the rates which a common carrier can
charge."180 The Teamsters agreed: 'There are 17,000 regulated
carriers, and an even greater number of private and exempt carri175. Id. at 119 (statement of Frank E. Fitzsimmons, General President, Brotherhood of Teamsters).
176. Id. pt. 2, at 518 (statement of Walter Shea, Administrative Assistant to the
General President, Brotherhood of Teamsters).
177. Id. pt. 5, at 1622-23 (statement of James Jesinski, Secretary-Treasurer, Local
200, Brotherhood of Teamsters).
178. Id. pt. 1, at 120.
179. Kennedy Hearings,supra note 112, at 162.
180. Cannon Hearings,supra note 113, at 95 (testimony of Bennett C. Whitlock,
Jr., President, American Trucking Associations).
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ers. They compete with railroads, water carriers, and pipelines."1 8 1
"that there is abundant
"It is obvious," the Teamsters concluded,
82
competition for shippers' business."1
Management and labor alike cited as evidence of competitiveness the option for carriers to file independent rates with collective
rate bureaus. "One of the important elements that we seem to forget in collective ratemaking," the American Trucking Associations
contended, "is that there is complete freedom of independent action by the motor carriers. If they would like to fie a different rate,
they have the right to do s0."183 "So long as that right remains,"
another carrier added, "the shipping public is protected from any
arbitrary collective action."1 84 Teamster president Fitzsimmons
agreed that "[t]he law also has built-in safeguards which permit a
from other members who parcarrier to take action independent
85
ticipate in the collective rate."'
Remarkably, management and labor seized on identical evidence as proof of the industry's satisfactory performance under
regulation, citing, inter alia, the trend in motor carrier rates as
compared to that of prices generally. "Motor carrier regulation,"
Mr. Whitlock of the American Trucking Associations argued,
has been an effective tool in combating inflation.
From a base of 100 in 1967, the revenue per ton-mile of regulated motor
common carriers of general freight rose to 166.2 in 1977. In contrast, the
rose to 181.5 or 15 points higher than the
Consumer Price Index of 1977
18 6
price of most carrier service.

Said the Teamsters: "Taking 1967 as the base year equal to 100%,
the wholesale price index had risen to 194.2%, the consumer price
index to 181.5%, while the revenue per ton-mile of general freight
carriers to 166.2% for 1977."187
Both groups claimed that shippers were satisfied with service
under regulation. "The best test of adequacy of competition," the
American Trucking Associations argued,
lies with the users of motor truck service-the shippers. In 1975, the Department of Transportation released the results of a nationwide survey of
193 manufacturing plants covering 19 major urban areas. The survey was
181. Id. pt. 2, at 520 (statement of Walter Shea, Administrative Assistant to the
General President, Brotherhood of Teamsters).
182. Id.
183. Id. pt. 1, at 98 (statement of Bennett C. Whitlock, Jr., President, American
Trucking Associations).
184. Kennedy Hearings, supra note 112, at 167 (statement of William J. Jones,
Vice President, Traffic, Wilson Trucking Co.).
185. Id. at 185.
186. Cannon Hearings, supra note 113, at 102.
187. Kennedy Hearings,supra note 112, vol. 2, at 1025 (letter from Frank E. Fitzsimmons to Senator Kennedy, 3 May 1978).

1983]

VERTICAL COLLUSION

designed to elicit responses as to a general evaluation of motor carrier
services. More than two-thirds of the surveyed companies rated motor
carriers service as quite good (65.5%) or excellent (10.4%). On the other
acceptable and
end of the scale, less than 3 percent rated it as minimally
18 8
less than 1 percent (0.52%) rated it as unsatisfactory.

The Teamsters agreed that "the services offered by [truckload]
carriers have been satisfactory to shippers."189
Finally, both groups attacked the claim that regulation resulted
in inefficiency and waste. According to the American Trucking Associations: 'There is, of course, empty mileage, of the true
'backhaul' variety that naturally results from the operation of specialized trucks designed to carry specific cargos. . . . Other empty
mileage results from the material imbalance of freight from one
section of the country as compared to another."1 90 The ATA concluded that empty mileage "comes from regional, geographic, demographic and industrial factors, not transportation regulatory
policy."'91 Labor representatives agreed. Empty mileage, a Teamster spokesman argued, "is due to regional traffic imbalances and
to specialized equipment that logically can haul only the freight it
is designed for-for example, autos, gasoline, milk, or refrigerated
concluded, "deregulation
foods.192 "Obviously," the Teamsters
93
won't affect either of these factors."'
10. Summary: Trucking
So comfortably had management and organized labor come to
coexist within a governmentally-cartelized environment, that they
unabashedly embraced one another in a collective fight to deflect
deregulation. The arguments made by each were uncannily parallel both to one another as well as to those of their counterparts in
airlines.
Their collaborative efforts, however, appeared at first to have
188. Id. vol. 3, at 1512 (statement of American Trucking Associations).
189. Cannon Hearings, supra note 113, pt. 2, at 521 (statement of Walter Shea,
Administrative Assistant to the General President, Brotherhood of Teamsters). See also Howard Hearings,supra note 114, pt. 3, at 769 (statement of
Frank E. Fitzsimmons, General President, Brotherhood of Teamsters); Kennedy Hearings,supra note 112, at 160 (statement of Gene T. West, Vice President, Consolidated Freightways Corp.); id. at 170 (statement of Gerald Cole,
Senior Vice President, Cole's Express); id. at 262 (statement of Vernon Farriba, Executive Vice President, Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference).
190. Cannon Hearings,supra note 113, pt. 3, at 217 (statement of American Trucking Associations).
191. Id. at 218.
192. Howard Hearings,supra note 114, pt. 1, at 147 (statement of Edward R. Toliver, Coordinator, Joint Council 3, Teamsters).
193. Id.
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been in vain, for passage of the Motor Carrier Act of 19801 94-calling for a shift in the burden of proof from applicants seeking operating authority to those protesting such competitive entry,
narrowing the class of protestants, broadening existing operating
authorities, and establishing zones of freedom within which rates
could be varied without Commission hearings and sanctionseemed to presage phased deregulation of the industry. Indeed,
under the liberalized administration of Chairman Gaskins, competition began to emerge as grants of operating authority increased,
certificates of authority were loosened, and rate discounts of five to
twenty percent were quickly established.195 Nor, it appeared,
could organized labor continue with effortless regularity to obtain
magnanimous pay increases from companies previously able to au96
tomatically pass higher costs onto shippers.1
Companies and labor reacted to these developments in predictable-i.e., parallel, fashion. The American Trucking Associations,
for example, denounced "an economist-oriented, self-destructive
Commission" acting with "wanton disregard for congressional directives,"' 97 while the Teamsters decried the Commission's "headlong plunge toward administrative deregulation."198
This continuing labor-management pressure has dampened
prospects for sympathetic implementation of the deregulation statute-in part, because the Motor Carrier Act of 1980 permits what
the Joint Economic Committee found to be "a broad degree of discretion in its enforcement by the ICC,"'199 and, in part, because the
Reagan administration has shown pronounced receptivity to the
industry's complaints regarding competition. Thus, it is noteworthy that the President appointed Reese Taylor as chairman of the
Commission, thereby making good a campaign promise to the industry to "pick commissioners with practical experience who
194. Pub. L. No. 96-296.
195. Miller, FirstReport Cardon Trucking Deregulation,Wall St. J., March 8, 1982,
at 18, col. 4.
196. N.Y. Times, Jan. 24, 1982, at 1, col. 3. While unemployment rates in trucking
subsequently increased, the General Accounting Office concluded that the
severe recession of 1981-1982, not deregulation, has been primarily responsible for this development. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, EFFECTs OF
REGULATORY REFORM ON UNEMPLOYMENT IN THE TRUCKING INDUsTRY

2 (1982).

197. Motor CarrierReform Act of1980: HearingsBefore the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,97th Cong., 1st Sess. 51, 54 (1981) (statement of American Trucking Associations) [hereinafter cited as Motor Carrier
Reform Act ].
198. Id. at 83 (statement of R.V. Durham, Director, Safety and Health Department,
Brotherhood of Teamsters).
199. Retreat from Competition"Trucking Regulationat the ICC,Report of the Joint
Economic Comm., 97th Cong., 2nd Sess. 5 (1982).
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would show caution" in applying the statute.200 Like management
and labor, Mr. Taylor found deregulation distinctly distasteful: "I
really don't like to use the word," he told a Congressional committee, adding that the 1980 Act, in his opinion, had been misinterpreted as a "trucking deregulation" bill.201 Since then, he has
effectively translated theory into practice. As the Joint Economic
Committee recently noted, "the ICC under Chairman Taylor has
abandoned the goal of a freely competitive trucking market and
has moved to reverse the progress toward deregulation which has
recently been made." 'This policy," the Committee concluded,
"contradicts the intent of Congress embodied in its passage of the
2 2
1980 Motor Carrier Act." 0
Thus, coalescing vertical power may yet succeed in achieving
"re-regulation" of the trucking industry by administrative
subversion.
III. THE PRIVATE SECTOR
In the typical oligopoly, economic theory tells us, a noncompetitive industry structure militates toward noncompetitive conduct
and tends to yield noncompetitive performance. Entry is at a minimum or nonexistent. A close-knit, co-fraternal group of producers
can achieve a relative degree of safety by establishing concerted,
tacitly collusive, and consciously parallel market strategies. Occasional mavericks may from time to time disturb the status quo of
forebearing co-existence, but they eventually tend to be integrated
into the system and become members of the club. Price policy, in
particular, tends to be directed toward uniformity and inflexibility,
except in the case of upward movement; and, while the leadership
role may rotate sometimes among the oligopolists, the level of
product prices is anything but market-determined. Moreover, a
"civilized" relationship, animated by a live-and-let-live spirit, tends
to be established between companies and organized labor under
which the fruits of the oligopoly are shared through an institutionalized mechanism of price-cost-price escalation. Innovation tends
to be slow and lethargic, hampered by the bureaucratic dry rot
which afflicts monopoloid giantism. So long as the oligopoly can
protect itself from entry, it can luxuriate in the rewards of power
which consist not of exorbitant profits but the quiet life.2o3
200. Wall St. J., August 5, 1981, at 46, col. 4.
201. Trucking Deregulation Is It Happening? HearingBefore the Joint Economic
Comm., 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 70 (1981).
202. Motor CarrierReform Act, supra note 197, at 3. See also Re-regulating at the
ICC: "The Congress Made Me Do It!" REGULATIOx, Nov./Dec. 1981, at 5.
203. See, e.g., W. ADAms, THE STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN INDusTRY 73-135 (6th ed.
1982).

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62:621

Foreign competition, of course, is an unwelcome challenge to
the existence and exercise of oligopoly power. It disrupts the wellordered functioning of a private domain, where the rules of the
game are understood and observed by all parties. It injects uncertainty and instability into the very foundations of the oligopoly
structure by undermining the recognition of mutual interdependence and the price policies concomitant therewith. Foreign competition-the nemesis of price maintenance schemes and "orderly"
market arrangements-becomes an obvious target for both labor
and management groups striving for survival and growth by immunizing themselves from effective competition. 20 4
The following discussion of the efforts to protect the entrenched
oligopolies in the U.S. automobile and steel industries illustrates
the coalescence of labor-management power in the private sector
of the economy.
A.

Automobiles

The first formal attempt by the automobile industry to immunize itself from foreign competition-the only real competition it
has encountered since World War II- dates back to the last recession. On July 11, 1975, the United Auto Workers (UAW) (with the
tacit support of the industry) filed a complaint with the United
States Treasury, charging that "new, on-the-highway, fourwheeled, passenger automobiles from Belgium, Canada, France, Italy, Japan, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and West Germany"
were being sold in the United States at less-than-fair value in violation of Section 201(c) of the Antidumping Act of 1921,205 thereby
causing injury to the domestic auto industry. 20 6 Specifically, the
complaint charged that the increased market share of imported
automobiles-up from 15.2 percent in 1970 to 15.9 percent in 1974 to
20.3 percent in the first half of 1975-was "at the expense of domestic sales"; that, discounting the effects of the United States recession, there was still a loss of domestic sales to imports; and that the
pricing of imported cars caused the resulting injury to the American automobile industry and its workers. The union demanded
the imposition of dumping penalties and simultaneously asked
Congress for quota protection against the imports of compacts and
204. See, e.g., Adams and Dirlam, "Import Quotas and Industrial Performance"
contained in WELFARE ASPECTS OF INDUSTRIAL PERFORMANCE 153-81 (Jacquemin & De Jong ed. 1977).
205. Ch. 14, 42 Stat. 11 (1921) (repealed Pub. L. No. 96-39, tit. I, § 106(a), 93 Stat. 193
(1979)).
206. New, On-the-highway, Four-wheeled, Passenger Automobiles: Notice of 30day Inquiry and Hearing, 40 Fed. Reg. 34,027 (1975).
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20
subcompacts from Europe and Japan. 7
In its comments on the UAW complaint, the United States
Council on Wage and Price Stability informed the International
Trade Commission that the most important factors explaining the
increased market share of foreign automobiles "are the pricing policies of domestic producers and the inability of domestic manufacturers to respond rapidly to changing market conditions." 20 8 The
Council cautioned that the imposition of special dumping penalties "would likely result in an immediate increase in the price of
automobiles to the American consumer. Moreover, such penalties,
or even the threat of penalties, could substantially check what has
been perhaps the single most effective spur to competition in this
highly concentrated industry. This, in turn, could lead to less com209
petitive prices and a reduced level of innovation.
Ultimately, the Union's complaint was resolved by a bizarre
consent settlement arranged by the United States Treasury Department. Under the settlement, five foreign manufacturers
agreed to raise their prices in the United States market, and fourteen other foreign manufacturers agreed to have their prices monitored by the Treasury for the next two years. With respect to five
210
foreign firms, the Treasury took no action at all.
During the current recession, which started in 1979, the industry again demanded protection against the depredations of import
competition. In parallel petitions filed with the International
Trade Commission by the United Auto Workers and Ford Motor
Company-formally supported by Chrysler and tacitly endorsed
by General Motors-industry spokesmen correctly contended that,
between the first half of 1979 and the first half of 1980, there occurred a significant decline in production, sales, capacity utilization, and employment in the domestic automobile industry as a
whole. 21n They also contended that, during the same period, there
occurred a significant increase in the import penetration of the
United States market for passenger automobiles and light
trucks. 212 Concluding that the growing volume and increased market share of imports constituted an "important" or 'primary"

207. U.S. INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION, Pub. No. 739, DOMESTIC SALES REPORT (1975).
208. Comments of the Staff of the Council on Wage and Price Stability: Before the
U.S. International Trade Commission 5 (Sept. 5, 1975) (In the Matter of the
Importation of Passenger Automobiles from Europe, Canada and Japan (Inv.
No. AA1921-INQ2)).
209. Id. at 4.
210. U.S. INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION, Pub. No. 1110, CERTAIN MOTOR VEMCLES AND CERTAIN CHSSsis THEREFOR A-98 to -100 (1980).
211. Id. at A-27 to -42.
212. Id. at A-47 to -51, 49-52.
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cause of serious injury to the domestic auto manufacturers, they
asked the Commission to impose
mandatory controls on future im213
ports, specifically from Japan.
The Commission rejected the UAW-Ford petitions, finding that
the industry's malaise was primarily attributable to: (1) the impact of the recession on the overall demand for cars and trucks,
and (2) the failure of U.S. manufacturers to adjust their product
mix to shifts in consumer demand.214 Undeterred by this reversal,
the industry- again with active labor support and the benevolent
intermediation of government- persuaded the Japanese to accept
a "voluntary" quota on their auto exports to the United States. 215
Under the provisions of the agreement, Japan promised, starting in
April, 1981, and for two years thereafter, to reduce its exports from
1.82 million vehicles (1980) to 1.68 million annually, and to take no
more than 16 percent of the growth (if any) in United States domestic consumption in subsequent years. 2 16 This was not the ideal
solution that the wielders of coalescing power had wanted, but it
served, at least temporarily, as an acceptable "second best."
Throughout the campaign for import restraints-before administrative tribunals, Congressional committees, and in public opinion forums-the auto companies and the United Auto Workers
presented an array of uncannily parallel arguments as rationales
for increased protection.
1. Symbiotic Government-Business Relationshipin Exporting
Countries
According to both management and labor, a symbiosis characterizes the relationship between foreign governments and their automobile industries. The Japanese government, in particular, is
said to protect and nourish its auto industry; to help the industry
target export markets for invasion; and to rely on auto exports to
maintain domestic employment as well as to generate foreign exchange earnings with which to finance energy imports. Therefore,
it is argued, the United States must protect itself and its basic industries from the adverse consequences of this mercantilist policy.
Petitioning the United States International Trade Commission
213. Id. at 161-65, 176-77. See Pearson &Takacs, Should the U.S. Restrict Auto Imports? 24 CHALLENGE 47-49 (1981).

214. See supra note 210, at 1, 134-42.
215. Bus. WK., Oct. 20, 1980, at 43, col. 1; Wall St. J., Oct. 28, 1980, at 3, col. 1; Wall St.
J., Nov. 11, 1980, at 3, col. 4. See also, N.Y. Times, Dec. 8, 1982, at 47, col. 1.
216. Issues Relating to the Domestic Auto Industry: HearingBefore the Subcomm.
on InternationalTrade of the Senate Comm. on Finance, 97th Cong., 1st Sess.
9-10 (1982) (prepared statement of David MacDonald, Deputy U.S. Trade
Representative).
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for import protection in August of 1980, Ford Motor Company
argued:
For decades while industry in Japan was developing, the Japanese government was supporting its domestic producers by forbidding significant
competition from foreign manufacturers and by providing access to credit
on favorable terms and providing important tax and export subsidies. The
objective of these deliberate policies of the Government of Japan was to
develop a large, modern, world-class industry. In large part, the Japanese
auto manufacturers' ability to compete so well in export markets today
to this historical pattern of government protection and
can be traced
217
incentives.

"[T]his past pattern of strong support by the Japanese Government," Ford insisted, "makes intervention by the U.S. Government
to redress the balance appropriate today."2 18 It makes it incumbent on us, as Ford told the Senate International Trade Subcommittee, to "recognize the realities of world trade where nations use
their auto industries to promote national goals such as generating
employment,
industrial development and foreign exchange
2 19
earnings."

The United Auto Workers echoed these sentiments. In its prepared statement fied with the House Subcommittee on Trade in
March, 1980, the UAW argued:
The Japanese government decided in the 1950s to cultivate a powerful
auto industry. As it carried out effective industrial planning, the government carefully nurtured the auto industry. Its program included effective
barriers against imports, favorable tax laws and outright subsidies, consolidation of the industry into a few assemblers cooperating with affiliated
parts companies, and assistance in obtaining foreign technology without
direct investment control by foreigners. With such hothouse treatment,
the Japanese industry mushroomed from production of 715,400 vehicles in
1960 to 5.3 million vehicles in 1970, 10.0 million in 1979 and 11.0 million vehicles predicted for 1980.220
217. Ford Motor Co., Petition For Relief From Increased Imports of Passenger
Cars,Light Trucks, Vans, and Utility Vehicles Under Section 201 of the Trade
Act of 1974, U.S. InternationalTrade Commission 37 (1980) [hereinafter cited
as FordITC Petition].
218. Id.
219. Issues Relating to the DomesticAuto Industry: HearingsBefore the Subcomm.
on InternationalTrade of the Senate Comm. on Finance, 97th Cong., 1st Sess.,
pt. 1, 133 (1981) (statement of Will Scott, Vice President, Government Relations, Ford Motor Co.) [hereinafter cited as Danforth Hearings]. See also
United States-JapanEconomic Relations: Hearings and Markup on H. Con.
Res. 363 Before the Subcomms. on Asian and Pacific Affairs, and on International Economic Policy and Trade, of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs,
96th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-5 (1981) (statement of Will Scott, Vice President, Government Relations, Ford Motor Co.) [hereinafter cited as Wolff Hearings]; id.
at 11 (statement of Wendell Larsen, Vice President, Chrysler Corp.).
220. World Auto Trade: CurrentTrends and StructuralProblems: HearingsBefore
the Subcomm. on Trade of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 96th Cong.,
2d Sess. 72 (1980) (statement of Douglas A. Fraser, President, UAW) [hereinafter cited as Vanik Hearings (Mar. 1980)]. See also U.S. Trade Investment
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The UAW told Congress that "one of the ways we are getting...
outcompeted is that in other countries of the world, government is
giving more assistance to industry than we are"; that "the U.S. auto
industry must now be included in the list of industries 'incisively
targeted' by Japan"; that "we cannot stand idly by while the successful industrial planning and the highly coordinated export
strategy of another country-combined with the lack of planning in
the U.S.--has the effect of unfairly disrupting our industries and
workers and their communities"; that "[b] y refusing to devise and
implement planning for ourselves we are subjected to the influences of other countries' plans"; and, finally, that "refusal to take a
firmer hold of our economic destiny is becoming tragically
anachronistic." 2 21
2. Diversion of World Exports to the Unprotected U.S. Market
Management and labor further justified their demands for restriction of Japanese competition on the grounds that rampant protectionism in the world's major markets diverted Japanese exports
to an unprotected United States market and thus focused the full
brunt of Japanese expansionism on American companies and their
workers. Import restriction, they agreed, was a necessary offset
and belated defense to an ostensibly ubiquitous protectionism
abroad.
In its petition for protection before the International Trade
Commission, Ford Motor Company contended that "the size of the
U.S. market, the unusually low U.S. auto tariffs, and high import
barriers in Europe and elsewhere made it clear that the United
States would be the primary target for a surge of Japanese exports."222 The following month, this argument was repeated before
the House Committee on Foreign Affairs:
It's likely that the United States will remain the primary target of exports because: First, most of the major countries in the rest of the world
have already acted to restrict Japanese imports in some way or another;
second, the United States is the largest market in the world, and even
small percentage increases translate into large numbers of vehicles; and
third, the U.S. tariff structure for cars is among the world's lowest and
Policy; Imports and the Future of the American Automobile Industry: Hearing Before the CongressionalJoint Economic Comm., 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5
(1980) (statement of Douglas A. Fraser) [hereinafter cited as Bentsen
Hearings].
221. Bentsen Hearings, supra note 220, at 11, 17 (statement of Douglas A. Fraser,
President, UAW). See also Danforth Hearings, supra note 219, at 83 (statement of Douglas A. Fraser); id. at 59 (statement of Stephen L Schlossberg,
Director of Government and Public Affairs, UAW); id. pt. 3, at 108-09 (statement of Sheldon Friedman, Research Director, UAW).
222. Ford ITC Petition, supra note 217, at iii.
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without any formal or informal local content or other rules that generally
223
restrain imports in other parts of the world.

A Ford spokesman, commenting on the necessity of U.S. import
restrictions on Japanese products, exclaimed: "Everyone else has
done it. ' '224 "The other countries of the world have already set up
barriers against more Japanese products," Chrysler added;
"[t]here is no place those products can go but in here." 225 Both
firms decried the "open trading conditions in the U.S. auto market
which act as a magnet for Japanese exports because every other
important world market imposes substantial tariff and nontariff
'226
barriers to imports of Japanese autos.
Here, too, the Union was in complete agreement with management. Appearing before the House Subcommittee on Trade, UAW
president Fraser charged that "[p ractically every country exercises import restraint on autos in one form or another- through
high tariffs, outright quotas, orderly marketing arrangements, 'gen2 27
tlemen's agreements,' and various forms of non-tariff barriers."
"As the biggest, most open market in the world," he insisted, "the
U.S. auto market has been targeted by the Japanese for the lion's
share of its exports." 2 2 8 "In contrast to U.S. policy," explained Mr.
Fraser, "when Japanese autos have threatened to take a significant
segment of the market in various European countries, they have
been frozen at levels by gentlemen's agreements." 229 According to
the Union, "[o]ther countries have dealt with similar trade
problems in a more spohisticated [sic] manner," while the United
2 30
States receives "the leftovers from other countries' plans."
"Given the auto policies of the rest of the world and the present
disarray of the industry in North America," the Union reasoned,
223.

224.
225.
226.

227.
228.
229.
230.

Wol1Hearings,supra note 219, at 5 (statement of Will Scott, Vice President,
Government Relations, Ford Motor Co.). See also Vanik Hearings (Mar.
1980), supra note 220, at 100 (statement of Fred G. Secrest, Executive Vice
President, Ford Motor Co.).
Wolff Hearings,supra note 219, at 27 (statement of Will Scott, Vice President,
Government Relations, Ford Motor Co.).
Id. at 34 (statement of Wendell Larsen, Vice President, Chrysler Corp.).
Auto Situation, Autumn 1980: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Trade of the
House Comm. on Ways and Means, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 60 (1980) (statement
of Ford Motor Co.) [hereinafter cited as Vanik Hearings (Nov. 1980)]. "[ I]t
might be helpful," Ford suggested, "to look at other countries. In the European Community, for example, governments seem determined to limit Japanese cars to an overall share of 10%. We see no reason why Japan's share of
our car market should be more than Europe's 10%." Danforth Hearings,
supra note 219, pt. 2, at 173 (statement of D.N. McCammon, Vice President,
Ford Motor Co.).
Vanik Hearings (Mar. 1980), supra note 220, at 72.
Id. at 73.
Id.
Id.
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23 1
"immediate measures to redress the balance are required,"
can no longer afford to be the lone sitting
warning that "[t ]he U.S.
23 2
duck in this situation."

3. Need for Breathing Space to Make Adjustments
A third argument jointly pressed by management and organized labor in calling for protection from import competition was
that the industry vitally needed breathing space to adjust to the
sharp, unforeseen-and, they argued, unforeseeable-revolution
in the preferences of American car buyers. Only protection from
imports could provide the increased production volume and cash
flow which, they claimed, were essential if the industry were to
convert its products and production facilities to meet this revolution in market demand. Moreover, they fully agreed that only
quantitative restrictions could break the buyer loyalty that
threatened to bind American car buyers to Japanese auto
producers.
In its petition to the United States International Trade Commission, Ford elaborated on the contention that market demand had
radically shifted:
In cooperating fully with the Government's goal of achieving a doubling of
miles-per-gallon in the U.S. new car fleet between 1975 and 1985 to reduce
dependence on imported oil, the automobile industry was already committed to an extremely ambitious conversion to more fuel efficient cars and

trucks.
This conversion program was targeted at achieving substantial acrossthe-board improvements in fuel economy for all sizes of U.S. cars ....
This approach became insufficient, however, when the unforeseen events
last year in Iran, the gasoline shortages and resulting lines at gas stations
resulting from the Government's fuel allocation system, and the sudden
reversal in U.S. energy policy (decontrolling domestic oil prices) produced
a wholly unexpected shift and acceleration in U.S. consumer demand for
smaller cars.233

Hence, "[tihe U.S. industry 2was not-could not have been-prepared for this quick switch." 3
231. Id.
232. Danforth Hearings, supra note 219, pt. 2, at 147-48 (statement of Douglas A.
Fraser, President, UAW). See also Bentsen Hearings,supra note 220, 2-10
(statement of Douglas A. Fraser); United Auto Workers, Petition For Relief
Under Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974 From Import Competition From
ImportedPassengerCars,Light Trucks, Vans, and Utility Vehicles, U.S. International Trade Commission 178 (1980) [hereinafter cited as UAW ITC Petition]; Danforth Hearings, supra note 219, at 58-68 (statement of Stephen L
Schlossberg, Director of Government and Public Affairs, UAW); Vanik Hearings (Nov. 1980), supra note 226, at 50 (statement of Douglas A. Fraser).
233. Ford ITC Petition,supra note 217, at 3.
234. Id.
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"In these last 2 years," a Ford spokesman reasserted before the
House Foreign Affairs Committee in September of 1980,
the Japanese have taken a windfall advantage of the extremely abrupt
U.S. market shift that occurred when gasoline prices-held at artificially
low levels for years-suddenly doubled. Although U.S. producers were
well along the way to doubling the fuel efficiency of their fleets, we were
not yet2 3equipped
to meet the sudden change in U.S. consumer buying
5
habits.

The industry confronted "a situation where an abrupt change in
the market has occurred with the suddenness that makes it impossible for a long lead industry to convert so quickly."236 Or, as
Chryler's Mr. Iacocca put it, "imports are having a field day be237
cause our market changed faster than anyone could anticipate."
Union spokesmen concurred with management's contention
that the U.S. market had suffered sharp shifts in consumer preferences. 23 8 Thus, one UAW representative testified:
[C]learly the market took a very sharp turn. The auto companies were
not adequately prepared for that sharp a turn. This is an industry that
doesn't turn around very rapidly. It takes a fair amount of leadtime to get
everything into place. I believe that while the auto companies are selling
better cars now, or cars better adapted to the needs of the market than
they were before, they are not there fully yet. They don't have the models
fully developed that everyone wants. They don't have the ones that every239
one wants in full supply. We are simply working toward that solution.

"[T] he legally mandated [fuel efficiency] transition has not kept
up with the massive, abrupt shift in consumer demand," Mr. Fraser argued before the Joint Economic Committee in early 1980,
"and imports, largely from Japan, took a record 22 percent share of
the U.S. car market last year."240 "What happened when the gas
crunch came in 1979," another union member asserted, "was that
the consumer panicked and record numbers of foreign cars, sup235. Wolff Hearings,supra note 219, at 4.
236. Id. at 12-13 (statement of Will Scott, Vice President, Government Relations,
Ford Motor Co.). See also Vanik Hearings (Mar. 1980), supra note 220, at 107
(testimony of Fred G. Secrest, Executive Vice President, Ford Motor Co.).
237. Bentsen Hearings,supra note 220, at 144.
238. Yet, Union representatives were unwilling to completely absolve management of all responsibility. For example, Mr. Fraser disclosed that "[o]ur industry has been horribly negligent in not producing small cars before
[foreign producers] did. Our union advocated that the industry build small
cars as early as 1974 and they procrastinated and procrastinated and now we
find ourselves in this dilemma." Vanik Hearings (Mar. 1980), supra note 220,
at 66. Senator Javits put the following question to Mr. Fraser- "[I]s it a fact
that this situation has been brought on by a great management failure on the
part of the American automobile industry?" '"That is true," Mr. Fraser answered. Bentsen Hearings, supra note 220, at 23.
239. Danforth Hearings,supra note 219, pt. 2, at 133 (testimony of Howard Young,
Special Consultant to the President, UAW).
240. Bentsen Hearings, supra note 220, at 9.
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posedly fuel efficient, were sold. .... 241
Management and labor wholeheartedly agreed that, because of
such shifts, import reduction and restriction were essential to provide the "breathing space," the production volumes, and the cash
flow which the industry needed to retool, reconvert, and recover.
"Unless restrained," Ford argued in its petition to the International
Trade Commission, "further growth of import penetration will adversely affect the ability of the domestic producers to finance their
conversion to the new types of cars needed for the future. ' 242 A
Chrysler spokesman dispatched to the House Foreign Affairs Committee testified: "We need a year or two to get our feet on the
ground," and import restraints would provide the industry with
"breathing space in which to accomplish the very costly and timeconsuming transition to an entirely new generation of automobiles
that are responsive to consumer demand." 243 Ford's representative, Mr. Scott, declared before the House Subcommittee on Trade
that "[a]ction by the Congress and the Administration to effect
such temporary restraint will get the auto industry back on its feet,
and get the auto workers back on the job."244 "U.S. producers," he
added, "need the increased volume that import restraint will bring
products and facilities to produce
to complete the job of converting
'24 5
more fuel-efficient fleets.
Organized labor spokesmen fully supported management on
this score, too. UAW president Fraser testified before the House
Subcommittee on Trade that restricting Japanese imports would
"give us a breathing space that we need to convert our industry."246 Appearing before the Joint Economic Committee, Mr. Fraser again called for restraints on Japanese imports "to give the
American automobile industry the time to convert and compete." 247 In testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on International Trade, the Union once more urged that "Japanese export
restraint is needed in the short term to provide the American industry with the breathing space it needs in order to retool and recover from the ills that have afflicted it in the last couple of years,"
241. Wolff Hearings,supra note 219, at 294 (statement of Frank LoCascio, Secretary-Treasurer, Local 259, UAW).
242. Ford ITC Petition, supra note 217, at 4.
243. Wolff Hearings,supra note 219, at 12-14 (testimony of Wendell Larsen, Vice
President, Chrysler Corp.).
244. Vanik Hearings (Nov. 1980), supra note 226, at 60.
245. Id. at 62. See also Danforth Hearings, supra note 219, at 134 (statement of
Will Scott, Vice President, Government Affairs, Ford Motor Co.); id. at 136
(statement of Pierre H. Gagnier, Financial Liaison Executive, Chrysler

Corp.).
246. Vanik Hearings (Mar. 1980), supra note 220, at 66.
247. Bentsen Hearings, supra note 220, at 4. See also UAW ITC Petition, supra
note 232, at 275.
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and warned that "[c] ontinued unbridled expansion of the import
share threatens ... [a] remarkable five-year transition program."248 And, returning before the Subcommittee two months
later, the UAW praised Senate Bill 396-entitled "A Bill To Impose
Quotas on the Importation of Automobiles From Japan"-as legislation that "goes a long way toward providing [breathing space for
the industry] ."249
Management and labor also joined in arguing that quantitative
barriers to foreign competition were crucial to break the bonds of
buyer loyalty that both groups warned were arising between
American consumers and Japanese producers. "[A] consumer
who purchases a Japanese car now," Ford Motor Company claimed
in its petition to the International Trade Commission, "is more
likely to purchase another imported car in the future then [sic] he
is to buy any U.S. produced car."250 The result, Ford contended,
was menacing: "sales lost by a domestic producer to imports today
carry with them the assurance that more sales will be lost in the
future."2 51 "The momentum of Japanese imports must be
stopped," Ford demanded before the House Subcommittee on
Trade, "or we will face a major, if not insurmountable, problem in
recapturing lost consumers ...."252 Restricting imports, Chrysler
argued before the House Foreign Affairs Committee in 1980, and
again in 1981, before the Senate Subcommittee on International
Trade, was essential "to maintain necessary standards of customer
loyalty to U.S. products," 25 3 and thereby prevent "serious perma254
nent erosion in ... customer loyalties."
The Union echoed management's position on this point. Mr.
Fraser told Senator Bentsen during the Joint Economic Committee's hearings:
248. Danforth Hearings,supra note 219, pt. 1, at 84 (statement of Douglas A. Fraser, President, UAW).
249. Id. pt. 2, at 143 (statement of Douglas A. Fraser, President, UAW).
250. Ford ITC Petition,supra note 217, at 38-39.
251. Id.
252. Vanik Hearings (Nov. 1980), supra note 226, at 62 (statement of Ford Motor

Co.).
253. Wolff Hearings, supra note 219, at 12 (statement of Wendell Larsen, Vice
President, Chrysler Corp.).
254. Danforth Hearings, supra note 219, at 138 (statement of Pierre H. Gagnier,
Vice President, Chrysler Corp.). Ford's Mr. McCammon insisted that American car buyers were less than rational:
Well, part of the problem right now, as I indicated, was a matter of
perception among the public exactly what the situation is. In fact,
some people are willing now to spend $900 more for an Accord, for
example, than a Fairmont in order to save a nickel a day of gas ....
It isn't always a rational decision that is going on out in the world of

car buying.
Id. pt. 2, at 211.
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I might say in this connection, Senator, that one of the things that concerns me is that without that restraint, and if the imports keep increasing
during the span of time when the American automobile industry is getting
their house in order... there's likely to be a longer term problem due to a
thing in the auto industry known as consumer loyalty. It is a very, very
logical process. If you buy a product and you are satisfied with that product, why risk the chance of changing? And you are apt to go back.
And I think if we just stand idly by and let this matter develop
natu255
rally and normally, I don't know how we can ever turn it back.

Testifying before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, the
Autoworkers warned that such consumer loyalty and repeat buying behavior portended more ominous, long-run effects:
The continuing surge of imports into the U.S. threatens to have a lasting detrimental effect. In the auto industry, a company's market share
tends to be somewhat self-perpetuating because of the prevalence of repeat buying. Moreover, as a company boosts its current sales, its network
of dealerships expands and future car buyers become more familiar with
its products.
This lays the basis for higher sales in the not too distant
256
future.

Like management, the UAW repeatedly emphasized that brand
loyalty-as opposed to price-was an important key to Japan's success in the American car market.257
4. Cost of ProtectionLess Than the Cost of Inaction
Finally, management and labor agreed that the costs of import
protection were negligible and were far outweighed by the costs
which would result from a failure to protect the industry. The argument was two-fold. First, there was no risk of triggering retaliatory trade reaction because quantitative restrictions imposed by
the United States would merely reduce Japanese overtime production. Second, increased production and employment in the U.S.
auto industry would generate increased government tax revenues
while, at the same time, reducing public unemployment and associated welfare expenditures.
Curtailing Japanese exports to the United States by one million
units per year, Chrysler alleged, "will not threaten the jobs of Japanese workers .... The Japanese workers who have been working on overtime would not be laid off. There would be no need for
any kind of retribution in trade."258 Mr. Iacocca's proposed National Automotive Recovery Act-calling, inter alia, for import re255. Bentsen Hearings,supra note 220, at 6.
256. Wolff Hearings,supra note 219, at 57 (statement of UAW).
257. See Danforth Hearings, supra note 219, pt. 3, at 127 (testimony of Sheldon
Friedman, Director of Research, UAW); Vanik Hearings (Nov. 1980), supra
note 226, at 57 (testimony of Douglas A. Fraser, President, UAW).
258. Wolff Hearings,supra note 219, at 12, 16 (statement of Wendell Larsen, Vice
President, Chrysler Corp.).
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ductions--'ould not cause the layoff of a single 259
Japanese worker,
and it would not cause a trade war with Japan."
The UAW endorsed management's position. It told the Senate
Subcommittee on International Trade:
Some have expressed the fear that actions to restrict imports from Japan
would lead to retaliation. We don't think so. Restraint would not significantly increase the Japanese unemployment rate,. . . a reduction in exuse of overtime work, now
ports to the U.S. might simply lead to reduced
2 60
running 12-14 hours per week in Japan

In sum, the effects of import restrictions on Japanese 26production
and employment would be only marginally significant. 1
On the other hand, the benefits of import restrictions for the
United States would far outweigh the costs. A Ford spokesman assured the Senate Subcommittee on International Trade:
This temporary restraint will not be inflationary. Even assuming as
much as 15% higher prices for Japanese cars, the effect would be more
than offset by savings in unemployment costs and by the added tax revenues which will follow automatically as gains in U.S. car sales put our
plants and people back to work. American taxpayers already are bearing
the $3 billion cost of auto-related unemployment and tax revenues lost to
federal, state, and local governments. This really amounts to a subsidy to
support extraordinary levels of car imports from Japan-hardly in keeping
with 2the
spirit of scrutinizing every dollar of taxpayer expense with great
62
care.

The UAW made precisely the same point. Mr. Fraser testified:
Some have argued that it is costly to limit imports and to prop up the
domestic industry. We argue that-with the high-mileage domestic small
cars now available-the cost is not nearly as high as that of not saving the
auto sector.
Consider the costs of inaction. First, there are staggering losses in corporate tax revenues at all levels of governments. For example, in 1978, the
Big Three paid some $2.5 billion in federal income taxes alone. The Big
259. Danforth Hearings, supra note 219, at 136.
260. Id. at 85 (statement of Douglas A. Fraser, President, UAW).
261. See Bentsen Hearings,supra note 220, at 13 (statement of Douglas A. Fraser);
Vanik Hearings (Mar. 1980), supra note 220, at 75 (statement of Douglas A.
Fraser, President, UAW); Wolff Hearings,supra note 219, at 57 (statement of

UAW).
262. Danforth Hearings,supra note 219, pt. 2, at 173-74 (statement of D.N. McCammon, Vice President, Ford Motor Co.). The companies further embellished
this argument by warning that accession to what-in the industry's estimation-were "modest" claims would deflect calls for more extreme protectionist measures (from unidentified sources) which would touch off retaliatory
trade wars. General Motors, for example, boldly declared its support for "immediate and substantial reduction in passenger car exports to the United
States for a meaningful period of time" as a means of stemming "protectionist
pressures, both here and abroad, which could result in lasting harm to important world trading relationships." Id. at 243-44 (statement of General
Motors).
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Three's 1980 losses will make them eligible for some $3 billion in credits
and refunds - a swing of over $5 billion in federal tax receipts.
Second, the difference between a healthy and a sick auto industry in
government-financed unemployment insurance, welfare, TRA, food
stamps, and foregone personal income tax receipts comes to about $6
billion.
Compared to these public sector losses of some $11 billion for a year
such as 1980, not to mention the immeasurable cost in human suffering,
the cost3 of our proposals to temporarily limit imported cars ...
is
26
small.

In short, according to both management and labor, protecting the
auto industry from foreign competition was less costly to the nation than a policy of inaction and nonintervention.
5. Summary: Automobiles
In the foregoing study of the automobile industry, vertical
power was found to coalesce around a demand for protection from
foreign competition for a lethargic and unresponsive domestic automobile oligopoly. As was the case in the airline and trucking industries' fight against deregulation, auto companies and the UAW
presented a remarkably unified front on a number of issues, on a
number of occasions, and in a number of forums.
The exercise of coalescing power initially appeared to be only
partially successful. While, as indicated, Japanese producers
agreed in 1981 to restrict their exports to the U.S., this restraint
was to be strictly limited to provide a breathing space of two years'
duration. However, whether or not the restraint will indeed be
"temporary" is open to question; as the expiration date of spring
1983 approached, the industry successfully urged that current
im264
port restraints be extended in time and tightened in impact.
Domestic content legislation currently before the Congress at
the UAW's behest poses what may be the greatest challenge to the
post-war, "civilized" relationship between management and organized labor in this industry. 265 If enacted, this legislation would institute domestic content requirements---calculated as U.S. value
added as a percentage of wholesale price-applicable to all auto
manufacturers, foreign and domestic, producing more than 100,000
units for sale in the United States. 266 Steeply graduated by sales
volume, these requirements would reach as high as 90 percent for
263. Danforth Hearings, supra note 219, at 88-89.
264. Wall St. J., Oct. 18, 1982, at 2, col. 1.
265. Domestic content requirements designate the percentage of American-made
parts which must be contained in vehicles sold in the United States. Domestic Content Legislation and the U.S. Automobile Industry: Analyses of H.R.
5133 Before the Subcomm. on Trade of the House Comm. on Ways and Means,
97th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1-2 (1982) (Congressional Budget Office study).
266. Id. at 7-8.
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manufacturers with sales exceeding 500,000 units.267 Their practical effect, according to the Congressional Budget Office, "would be
the imposition of a rigid import quota of 100,000 units per year on
each foreign auto producer"-a 65 percent reduction from current
import levels.268 The potential divisiveness of this proposed legislation-urgently classified as a "top legislative priority" by both
the UAW and the AFL-CIO-stems, of course, from the restrictive
impact which it would work upon the expanding internationalization of American auto companies and their increased reliance on
offshore sourcing for components. 269 Not surprisingly, therefore,
the "Big Three" have so far refrained from either endorsing or opposing local content legislation, doubtless in an effort to avoid, by
resort to diplomatic vagueness, a crucial test of the durability of
the "civilized relationship" between management and labor.
B.

Steel

In steel, the drive for protection antedates the campaign in
automobiles. Faced with what the industry viewed as a mounting
import tide in the early 1960's, and after filing unsuccessful "countervailing duty" and "antidumping" complaints with the United
States Tariff Commission, it shifted its protectionist efforts to the
legislative and public relations front. This strategy, supported
from 1967 onward by the United Steelworkers, eventually paid off
with the signing of the Voluntary Restraint Agreement (VRA) that
went into effect on January 1, 1969.270
Under the Voluntary Restraint Agreement, annual steel im267. Id.
268. Id. at 9, 62.
269. Wall St. J., Sept. 3, 1982, at 6, col. 4. Despite the potential divisiveness of such
domestic content requirements, the coalescing, tacitly collusive relationship
between companies and the Union has to date bred a remarkable degree of
solicitude. Thus, rather than outrightly declaring their opposition to such proposals, management has followed a more diplomatic tack, characterizing
such legislation as constituting a distinctly "second-best" option. "The proposed legislation should be viewed as an instrument of last resort," Ford Motor Company suggested, "to be considered when other measures to correct
" Fair
trade inequities and imbalances have been tried and have failed ....
Practicesin Automotive ProductsAct: Hearingson H.R. 5133 Before the Subcomm. on Trade of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 97th Cong., 2d
Sess. 306 (1982) (statement of Philip Caldwell, Chairman of the Board, Ford
Motor Co.). As an example of what a "more effective" policy might comprise,
Mr. Caldwell intimated that "voluntary" import restraints might be extended
into "the mid-1980s." Id. at 341. While likewise sympathetic to the objectives
of domestic content requirements, the Chairman of the Board of General Motors, Roger B. Smith, did not believe that such legislation was "the best way
to achieve the objectives we all seek." Id. at 432.
270. Adams, Import Restraintsand IndustrialPerformance, MicH. Y.B. INT'L LEGAL STUD. 38 (1979).
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ports from Japan and the European Community were limited to 5.8
million tons each, compared to their then current levels of 7.5 million and 7.3 million tons, respectively. The Agreement also pro27
vided for an annual growth of 5 percent in the allowable quotas. 1
It was described approvingly by the Chairman of the Ways and
Means Committee of the United States House of Representatives
272
as a "welcome and realistic step."
Within three years, however the domestic industry found the
VRA unsatisfactory; quotas had not been established, either for
specific products or for individual exporting countries (other than
Japan). Moreover, both the Japanese and Europeans claimed that
fabricated structural steel and cold finished bars were not included
in the VRA quotas, since the quotas were expressed in terms of
tonnage. Therefore, they rapidly expanded their shipments of
stainless steel and other high-value products to the United States
market-despite their promise to "try to maintain approximately
the same product mix and pattern of distribution" as before the
accord was signed. 273 The effect of this upgrading in imports, combined with the inevitable increase in the price of imported steel,
was that the total value of steel imports was as high in 1970 as in
1968, notwithstanding a 25 percent decline in the volume of imports
274
during the same period.
As a result, the three-year extension of the Agreement-announced by the White House on May 6, 1972-contained specific
tonnage limitations on three categories of specialty steels (stainless, tool, and other alloys) and set the quotas at less than their
1971 import level. In addition, fabricated structural steel and coldfinished bars were specifically included in the Agreement. Also,
the participants agreed to maintain their product mix and their
customary geographic distribution pattern. Finally, a 2.5 percent
(instead of the former 5 percent) annual increase in the allowable
imports was to be applied to the global tonnage allocated to Japan
and the European Economic Community (EEC).275
Unfortunately (for the protectionists), the connivance between
the domestic industry, the State Department, and foreign steel
producers to limit imports triggered an antitrust suit by Consumers Union which charged that the VRA constituted a primafacie
conspiracy under the Sherman Antitrust Act. 276 While the Court
271.
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275.
276.

Id. at 38-39.
Id. at 39.
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L WEISS, CASE STUDIEs IN AMERICAN INDusTRY (2d ed. 1971).
Adams, supra note 270, at 39.
Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. Rogers, 352 F. Supp. 1319 (D.D.C.
1973), aff'd sub nom. Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. Kissinger, 506
F.2d 136 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1004 (1975).
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eventually ruled only on the State Department's authority to insulate the agreement from the antitrust laws, it left little doubt that
the foreign signatories to the pact could be held accountable for
participation in any trade restraints. 277 In any event, the decision
was clear enough to persuade all concerned that the VRA should
not be renewed when it expired in May, 1975.
After the passage of the Trade Act of 1974 which loosened the
standards of proof in antidumping actions, 278 renewed pressure for
import restraints was crowned with success -at first, in the industry's stainless and specialty steel sector. Following lengthy proceedings, the International Trade Commission ruled, in 1976, that
the domestic firms were indeed injured by rising imports, and recof quotas on four cateommended to the President the imposition
279
gories of specialty steel products.
Stating that quotas are an inflexible and relatively undesirable
remedy for the supposed injury, the President gave Japan, the
EEC, and Sweden ninety days to enter, voluntarily, into "orderly
marketing agreements" with the United States negotiators before
approving the Commission's recommendations. 28 0 Under the
threat, the Japanese gave in, signing a VRA on the final day of the
ultimatum. Quotas were imposed, as threatened, with the Japanese benefiting and the EEC losing, as compared to the original
28
Commission recommendations. 1
This arrangement for stainless and specialty steel producers
was soon followed in January, 1978, by a comprehensive protection
plan for the industry's much larger carbon steel sector. The mainstay of the plan was the Trigger Price Mechanism (TPM)282 which
established a thinly veiled price floor for nearly all imported steel,
and was calculated quarterly on the basis of Japanese production
costs, plus all exporting costs from Japan, plus an arbitrary percentage mark-up for "profits." Its avowed objective was to raise
steel prices in the U.S. market in order to give domestic producers
283
a "breathing spell" from import competition.
Here, as with the automobile industry, the protectionist cam277. Id.
278. See ADAMS & DnuuAm, Import Competition and the Trade Act of 1974: A Case
Study of Section 201 and its Interpretationby the InternationalTrade Commission, 52 IND. L.J. 535 (1977).
279. STAMESS STEEL AND ALLOY TOOL STEEL, TA201-5, U.S.LT.C. PuB. No. 756
(1976).
280. See 41 Fed. Reg. 11,269 (1976).
281. Id. at 24,101 (to be codified at 3 C.F.R. § 4445).
282. 42 Fed. Reg. 65,214 (1977) (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. § 141).
283. Findings of the Department of Treasury with Regard to the Coverage of Wire
Rod, Wire and Wire Products under the Trigger Price Mechanism 30 (April
13, 1978) reprinted in Adams, supra note 270, at 41.
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paign jointly waged by the steel industry and organized labor
rested on lines of argument characterized by an unmistakable
28 4
trace of conscious parallelism.
284. The pattern in steel, however, did differ from that of other industries in at
least one procedural respect. Steel evidenced explicit and outright collusion
between management and organized labor; pretenses of independence, in
other words, were immodestly dispensed with.
For example, while addressing the Economic Club of Detroit in 1968, the
president of the American Iron and Steel Institute, Mr. John P. Roche, was
asked "Is Labor supporting the steel industry's quota position in a beneficial
way?" "Happily," he responded, the Union had abandoned its free trade
stance to join with management:
I think most of you know that the United Steelworkers have had a
long-standing philosophical approach to the question of trade that is
very close to the free trade position of the government.
The Steelworkers last spring and summer could see that this was
no longer just a matter for pleasant academic discussion, that there
had to be some halt to imports, and happily as far as we're concerned, they joined with us last October in our support of the bills
that are before the Congress asking for a quota on steel imports. We
think their support is absolutely essential and it is not a perfunctory
support. The union's Washington office is working very closely with
the steel companies in attempting to get increasing support from the
Congress.
Address by J.P. Roche, President, American Iron and Steel Institute, before
the Economic Club of Detroit at 16-17 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Detroit
Economic Club Address].
Such collusion was formally acknowledged by I.W. Abel, president of the
Steelworkers, at a 1972 conference:
[It traditionally had been the policy of the American labor movement to be great and staunch free traders. For some reason or other
we prided ourselves on being able to expound that slogan. But in
view of that tradition and that policy, it was the decision of your officers to join with the leaders of the Steel Industry to try to cope with
this problem, and we jointly went to the leaders of Congress, and to
the Administration.
Press Release by I.W. Abel, President of United Steelworkers of America,
given at a News Conference at the Joint Conference on Imports and Productivity, Washington, D.C. (Dec. 1, 1972) (available at United Steelworkers of
America, AFL-CIO/CLC, Int'l. Hdq.).
Thus, management and labor "jointly petitioned the office of the Special
Trade Representative" in protesting an alleged bilateral agreement covering
steel flows between Japan and the Common Market. Vanik Hearings (1977),
infra note 295, at 313 (statement of Lloyd McBride, President, United Steelworkers). In another instance, Steelworker president McBride testified that
the "industry and the union have both advocated that there be an international mechanism to monitor steel flow and to provide safeguard relief
against market disruption." Id. at 314. In July of 1977, Mr. McBride and the
president of Jones & Laughlin Steel, Thomas C. Graham, convened a joint
news conference on imports. "Lloyd and I are here today to speak with you
about one of the most serious problems facing the American steel industry,"
Mr. Graham began, "[that being] the flood of steel imports into the U.S. marketplace." Id. at 393.
In 1975, the tool and stainless steel industry and the Union jointly peti-
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Symbiotic Government-Business Relationshipin Exporting
Countries

Like their counterparts in the auto industry, spokesmen for
steel companies and steel workers justified their demand for protection from import competition by pointing to what they alleged
was the symbiotic relationship between virtually all foreign governments and their respective steel industries. With the exception
of the United States Government, both power blocs contended that
foreign nations relied on their steel industries as instruments of
national policy in pursuing such objectives as maintaining full employment, increasing foreign exchange earnings, and shoring up
their balance of payments. Because foreign steel producers were
immune from profit and loss considerations, management and organized labor insisted that protection of the United States steel industry was both essential and equitable.
In hearings before the Senate Finance Committee in 1966, Mr.
John P. Roche, president of the American Iron and Steel Institute
(AISI), charged the world's principal steel-producing nations with
"using the great United States market as a means to further their
own social, political, and economic aspirations at our expense"
through the export of large tonnages to the United States "at
whatever price is necessary to get an order." 285 "The foreign steel
tioned the International Trade Commission to restrain foreign competition in
specialty steels. See Statement of Allegheny Ludlum before the International
Trade Commission (1977). Appearing before the House subcommittee in 1978,
the Union's Mr. Sheehan declared that "President McBride of the Steelworkers, and Mr. Speer, of the American Iron and Steel Institute, are jointly seeking from the Committee legislative support for an international steel sector
arrangement." Vanik Hearings (1978), infra note 290, at 107. "We have recently submitted to the Department of Labor's Steel Sector Advisory Committee the joint union-industry proposal that there be no reduction of steel
tariffs unless an international safeguard mechanism be developed," Mr.
Sheehan explained. Id.
A statement jointly issued by the Union and the American Iron and Steel
Institute in 1978 cited "the serious nature of the worldwide steel crisis and
the need for sector negotiations leading to the establishment of an international mechanism providing prompt and effective relief from market disruption," while urging that "tariff cuts be made contingent upon the achievement
of a multilateral agreement leading to long-term resolution of world steel
problems"-a proposal that compelled Congressman Gibbons to remark that
"that translates into a world cartel on steel." Vanik Hearings (1978), infra
note 290, at 113, 119. Similarly, the Labor-Management Committee for Fair
Foreign Competition--comprising "24 companies and unions having offices or
facilities in the Western steel market"--was established in 1970 and, in 1977,
"brought to the attention of the [International Trade Commission] the critical conditions of the western steel industry" in calling for restraint of foreign
competition. Vanik Hearings (1980), infra note 291, at 71-72.
285. Steel Imports: HearingsBefore the Senate Comm. on Finance, 89th Cong., 2d
Sess. 269 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Long Hearings (1966)].

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62:621

producer," Mr. Roche asserted, "functions under an economic system in which he feels obligated to maintain the highest practicable
28 6
operating level regardless of his home market conditions."
The chairman of Armco Steel, Mr. C. William Verity, argued in
1973 before the House Ways and Means Committee that "production costs are not the determining factor in steel export prices of
foreign producers." Mr. Verity also asserted that foreign producers frequently "price the product to get into our market in order
to achieve domestic economic objectives, such as inflow of dollars,
improved balance of payments, or maintenance of full employment
of their steel mills."287 Said Mr. Roger S. Ahlbrandt, spokesman
for the specialty metals industry and chairman of Allegheny
Ludlum:
Politico-economic policies of Western Europe, as a whole, and Japan
have been designed to achieve continuous investment; dependability of
raw material supply, and a maximization of foreign currency earnings for
the industry by public subsidy or ownership; trade protection and export
incentives; cartelization under public guidance; maintenance of undervalued currencies; and prohibition or effective disincentives, via non-tariff
barriers, to hinder significant investment or import
penetration of their
288
domestic steel markets by American producers.

"Consequently," Mr. Ahlbrandt concluded, "they are better armed
to 'go for the jugular'. . . as their national policies dictate .... ,,289
"We operate in a world market where over 70 percent of the output is produced in facilities which are government owned or controlled," the chairman of the American Iron and Steel Institute
reiterated before the Senate Finance Committee in 1974. Therefore, "we must have adequate safeguards against floods of imports
coming in at very low prices supported by other governments to
' 290
further their own political and economic policies.
286. Id. at 271. See also Import Quotas Legislation: Hearings Before the Senate
Comm. on Finance,90th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, 839 (1967) [hereinafter cited as
Long Hearings (1967) ]; American Iron and Steel Institute, Background Memorandum on American Iron and Steel Institute Steel Import Policy, 5, 7 (1967)
[hereinafter cited as AISI Background Memo].
287. Trade Reform: HearingsBefore the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 12, 3965 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Mills Hearings
(1973) ].
288. Id. at 3974.
289. Id.
290. Trade Reform Act of1973: Hearingson H.R. 10710 Before the Senate Comm. on
Finance, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 4, 1081-82 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Long
Hearings (1974) ]. See also Administration'sComprehensive ProgramFor the
Steel Industry: HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Trade of the House Comm.
on Ways and Means, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 78 (1978) (statement of Edgar B.
Speer, Chairman, American Iron and Steel Institute); id. at 172 (statement of
William H. Knoell, President, Cyclops Corp.); id. at 177 (testimony of Roger
Regelbrugge, President, Korf Industries) [hereinafter cited as Vanik Hearings (1978) ].
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In 1979, the American Iron and Steel Institute retrod what had
become a well-worn path. Testifying before the House Subcommittee on Trade, the president of the AISI, Mr. Robert Peabody,
argued once more that "[ifn most foreign steel producing countries, the steel industry is an instrument of national and social policy. Steel has been exported at almost any price in order to
maintain employment." 291 "The facts are clear," the president of
Allegheny Ludlum, Mr. Richard P. Simmons, asserted before the
House Subcommittee on Economic Development in late 1981;
"[w] e are unwilling combatants in a trade war, initiated by other
nations to serve their own political, social, and economic pur292
poses." '"The losers," Mr. Simmons warned, "will be all of us."
Spokesmen for the United Steelworkers wholeheartedly supported management. "[M] ost of these [steel exporting] countries,"
the Union asserted in congressional testimony on steel imports in
1966, "have social practices which forbid or hinder lay-offs in times
of reduced demands. So production schedules must be maintained. And the excess must be disposed of somehow, even at distress prices."2 93 Foreign producers, Union officials insisted, "are
propelled by a complusive urge to maintain production by expanding their share of the export market through drastic price
294
sacrifices."
The Union reiterated this argument in its 1977 testimony before
the House Subcommittee on Trade: "Imports are not only a function of productivity, wage rates, and technological innovation. To a
growing extent they are also a function of social policies in foreign
producing nations which are designed to insulate the foreign producers from the trauma of economic fluctuations." 295 "Social obli291. Problems in U.S. Steel Market: FieldHearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Trade
of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 110 (1980)
[hereinafter cited as Vanik Hearings (1980)].
292. Economic Health of the Steel Industry and the Relationship of Steel to Other
Sectors ofthe Economy: HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Economic Development of the House Comm. on Public Works and Transportation,97th Cong.,
1st Sess. 99 (1982) [hereinafter cited as OberstarHearings].
293. Impact of Imports and Exports on American Labor: Hearingson H.R. 16,831
and H.R. 17,248 Before the General Subcomm. on Labor of the House Comm.
on Educationand Labor, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 201 (1967) (statement of United
Steelworkers) [hereinafter cited as Dent Hearings]. The Union recognized
that unilateral restriction of steel imports by the United States would invite
corresponding exclusion of U.S. steel abroad. Thus, the Steelworkers called
for an international, multilateral agreement on dumping. "Dumping," according to the Union's suggested definition, would occur whenever exports were
priced below "going prices" in the markets receiving them-a definition
which, if adopted, would effectively eliminate price competition. Id. at 201-02.
294. Long Hearings (1967), supra note 286, at 890 (statement of Joseph P. Molony,
Vice President, United Steelworkers).
295. World Steel Trade: Current Trends and StructuralProblems: Hearing Before
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gations to workers developed by legislation . . . and economic
commitments to investments by foreign governments," the Union's
representative, Mr. Sheehan, argued, "fuel their drive for exports."29 6 "American steelworkers and steel companies," the
Union contended, "are, therefore, faced with a competing social
policy in addition to market economic competition." 2 97 "The consequences of such an economic-social policy cannot be counterbalanced by pure competition in the American marketplace," the
29
steelworkers concluded. 8
Union representatives returned to this argument again in 1978.
A policy statement on jobs and steel imports declared:
We have not lost our markets to foreign producers who can sell in the
American market at lower cost than American producers. Rather, we are
losing our markets to steel dumped in the United States at prices far below what it costs to produce that steel in foreign mills. Foreign nations are
exporting their unemployment to the United States by means of government loans, subsidies, and tax concessions which enable their steel mills
to keep producing and selling to American consumers
regardless of
2 99
whether they make a profit, or even break even.

"All too frequently," Steelworker president McBride lamented
before the House Subcommittee on Economic Development in
1981, "our trading partners pursue social policies to protect employment and capital, to the detriment of our workers and businesses." 300 "Unless we conduct ourselves in such a way as to deal
with the problems other countries create for us," warned Mr. McBride, "it seems to me we are not going to be able to deal with the
problems successfully."301
2. Diversion of World Exports to the Unprotected U.S. Market
Steel companies and steel workers-like their colleagues in the
automobile industry-also supported their demand for protection
by pointing to allegedly ubiquitous protectionism abroad which,
they charged, concentrated the full force of growing world steel
exports on a large and unprotected American market. Underlying
the problem of foreign steel exports to the United States, they contended, was a substantial, chronic, excess steel-making capacity

296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.

the Subcomm. on Trade of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess. 314 (1977) (statement of Lloyd McBride, President, United Steelworkers) [hereinafter cited as Vanik Hearings (1977)].
Id. at 307 (statement of Jack Sheehan, Legislative Director, United
Steelworkers).
Id. at 312 (statement of Lloyd McBride, President, United Steelworkers).
Id.
Vanik Hearings (1978), supra note 290, at 109 (testimony of John J. Sheehan,
Legislative Director, United Steelworkers).
Oberstar Hearings,supra note 292, at 27.
Id. at 40.
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abroad. They claimed that this excessive capacity was due to two
foreign governmental policies: industrialized nations have sought
to maintain high levels of employment in their home markets;
while developing countries have sought to invest in new steel capacity. Protection of the U.S. market, company and union spokesmen reasoned, not only would be equitable, but would also deter
"reckless" capacity expansion abroad.
As early as 1966, AISI president Roche warned the Senate Finance Committee that "we should expect that imports will continue to be sold in increasing volume at whatever prices they will
bring in the world's largest and freest market-the United
States." 302 The following year, AISI Chairman Worthington
pressed the argument at a congressional breakfast sponsored by
his trade association: "America is a prime target for these exports
because the steel market in the United States is not only the largest and most diversified in the world-it is also the most open and
easily accessible in the world."303 As a result, he argued, "the
United States market is thus being used by foreign mills as a kind
of 'Bargain Basement' in which to dispose of their surplus production."304 AISI's president, Mr. Roche, reiterated the argument in a
1968 address to the Economic Club of Detroit, insisting that the
"United States has been the nation most adversely affected by the
growth in free world surplus capacity" because, inter alia, "this
country has fewer restrictions on steel imports than any other
305
country.

In 1977, the chairman of Armco Steel, Mr. Verity, warned of "a
secret arrangement whereby the Japanese agreed to limit exports
to Europe. The result was a drastic steel trade diversion by the
Japanese from Europe to the United States." 306 The following
year, Mr. Speer of the AISI, repeated charges "that a cartel arrangement between the European Community and Japan had
302. Long Hearings (1966), supra note 285, at 273.
303. Text of speech by L.B. Worthington, Chairman, American Iron and Steel Institute, at Second Annual AISI Public Affairs Conference Congressional
Breakfast, Washington, at 7 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Congressional Breakfast Address].
304. Id. at 8. See also Time For A New Look at Foreign Trade, address by R.
Blough, Chairman of the Board, United States Steel Corp., before joint dinner
meeting of the Commerce and Industry Association of New York, and World
Trade Club, at 10 (1967).
305. Detroit Economic Club Address, supra note 284, at 6. See also Long Hearings
(1974), supra note 290, at 1081 (statement of Stewart S. Cort, Chairman,
American Iron and Steel Institute); Tariff and Trade Proposals: Hearings
Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 6, 1756
(1970) (statement of George A. Stinson, Chairman, American Iron and Steel
Institute) [hereinafter cited as Mills Hearings (1970)].
306. Vanik Hearings (1977), supra note 295, at 317.
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caused a substantial amount of Japanese steel to be directed into
the United States, rather than to European markets." 307 Again in
1979, the charge was trumpeted before yet another congressional
committee:
Failure to deal adequately with the Japanese- European cartel has led,
as predicted, to a proliferation of similar arrangements. Today, bilateral
agreements exist between Europe and 18 different nations. The central
feature of these agreements is a quantitative restriction on steel exports
to the European Community. This limitation applies not just to overall
deliveries in Europe, but on a product-by-product and region-by-region
basis, with shipments being phased over time.
In addition, the signatories are committed to observe Community price
lists, less a specified percentage. In the case of developing countries such
as Brazil, South Africa, and South Korea, for instance, the delivered price
may not be less than 6 percent below Community list prices for carbon
steel products.
It should come as no surprise, therefore, that these same nations have
significantly increased exports to the United States.3 0 8

While management was delegated the primary responsibility
for making this argument, organized labor lent its support when
needed. "With other markets thus insulated," Steelworker president McBride contended in 1977 before the House Subcommittee
on Trade, "the relatively bare U.S. marketplace acts as a lightening
rod and we are forced to absorb the displaced trauma." 309 At a
news conference jointly convened by the Steelworkers and Jones &
Laughlin Steel in 1977, Steelworker president McBride agreed with
management's charge of collusion between Japan and European
producers: "[the Japanese] have agreed with the European Common Market nations to a quota system," asserted Mr. McBride;
"[ilt leaves only one nation in the world for them to send their
steel to and that is to the United States."3 10 "While the EEC benefited," Mr. McBride once again charged in 1981 before a House subcommittee, "we in the U.S. bore the brunt of their restrictive
policies." 311 Instead of protecting our national interests, the Union
president admonished committee members, "[o]ur government
appears to be more interested in being an island of2free trade in a
sea of restrictions, protectionism, and subsidies."31
Both management and union agreed that excess capacity was
307. Vanik Hearings (1978), supra note 290, at 80.
308. Vanik Hearings (1980), supra note 291, at 50 (statement of L. Frederick Gieg,
Jr., Vice President and General Manager, Western Steel Division, United
States Steel Corp.).
309. Vanik Hearings (1977),supra note 295, at 314. See also Mills Hearings (1970),
supra note 305, at 1826 (statement of John J. Sheehan, Legislative Director,
United Steelworkers).
310. Vanik Hearings (1977), supra note 295, at 314.
311. OberstarHearings,supra note 292, at 27.
312. Id.
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the crux of the problem. "Steel mill products are not being imported into the United States primarily because there is a great
need for them here," the president of the American Iron and Steel
Institute contended before the Senate Finance Committee in 1966,
"but rather because foreign production is in excess of home market needs." 313 Moreover, the problem was likely to worsen owing
to the policies of developing nations:
The ever-growing excessive foreign steel capacity and production, the
results of which plague the American steel industry, is augmented by the
race in many less-developed countries to attain self-sufficiency in steel
production. The less-developed countries have also built steel capacity at
a rapid rate for the purpose of improving their own balance of payments
314
situation and also as a status symbol irrespective of domestic demand.

The "excess capacity" theme was repeated in a 1967 background
memorandum delineating AISI's import policy. "Present imbalances in world steel trade are caused primarily by the large excess
of capacity," the memorandum declared:
What is more, planned expansion for the future will certainly not diminish
and may, in fact, aggravate the problem. A major part of this new capacity
was installed in Western Europe and Japan after World War fl-much of
it within the last five years-and some of it has been built expressly for
export purposes.
The continually growing excess of steelmaking capacity in industrialized nations abroad is further complicated by the construction of steelmaking plants in many developing countries. In the last decade some 20
countries have joined3 the
ranks of the steel producers for the first time
15
and more are coming.

Indeed, AISI supported its demand for steel tariffs by suggesting
that they "would encourage other nations to fit their steelmaking
plans more realistically to world requirements." 316
In 1973, the AISI chairman, Mr. Cort, again cited "[c]hronic excesses of foreign supply over foreign domestic requirements" as a
major cause of the "steel import problems." 31 7 Another AISI
spokesman, Armco's Mr. Verity, underscored what he construed as
the ominous and economically irrational trends in developing
countries. "They have been disruptive to the U.S. market," Mr.
313. Long Hearings (1966), supra note 285, at 269 (statement of John P. Roche).
"Much of this new capacity was installed in Western Europe and Japan after
World War ]I," Mr. Roche contended, charging "some of it admittedly has
been installed for the express purpose of exploiting export markets, particularly the United States." Id. at 272.
314. Id. Mr. Roche warned that "planned expansion for the future will not diminish and may, in fact, aggravate the problem." Id. See also Long Hearings
(1967), supra note 286, at 828 (statement of John P. Roche); Congressional
Breakfast Address, supra note 303, at 7.
315. AISI Background Memo, supra note 286, at 7-8.
316. Id. at 2-3. See also Detroit Economic Club Address, supra note 284, at 6.
317. Mills Hearings (1973), supra note 287, at 3961-62.

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62:621

Verity concluded, "and should not be encouraged." 3 18 Likewise, a
spokesman for the specialty metals industry warned of "unregulated and unrestrained foreign investment which is producing
over-capacity in specialty steels." 319 By 1978, the AISI characterized such alleged excess capacity as not merely chronic, but "deliberate." 320 In 1981, the president of the Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corporation opined that "as long as we have this tremendous European overcapacity that is largely government-owned and governto me quotas against European steel are
ment-subsidized, it seems
'32 1
a peculiarly apt tactic.
Here, also, Steelworker officials concurred with management.
"As world steelmaking capacity rose," the Union's Mr. Moloney
told the Senate Finance Committee in 1967, "steel-producing nations, with insufficient domestic demand, turned to foreign markets to unload production from excess capacity." 322 "I emphasize
again," Mr. Moloney said, "there is an extraordinary over-capacity
in steel production . . . [and it is] precisely this acceleration of
excess capacity, which has outstripped world demand, that has
caused pronounced repercussions upon the American steel industry."323 Like management, he suggested that "limitations of access
to the American market may decrease the tendency for overexpansion of world capacity."324
Even a boom market is not likely to solve, and may in fact exacerbate, the excess capacity problem, Steelworkers' Mr. Sheehan
told the House Ways and Means Committee in 1970:
The overseas boom, which has given us brief relief from steel imports, will
not last indefinitely. In fact, because part of this steel consumption boom
has involved a vast expansion in overseas capacity, rising pressure from
foreign imports is inevitable as the overseas boom subsides ....
demand, most foreign producers
Worse: Because of the high current
325
are expanding at a feverish rate.

Mr. Sheehan warned, "means return to
"So return to normalcy,"
326
excess capacity."
318. Id. at 3968.
319. Id. at 3973 (statement of Roger S. Ahlbrandt).
320. Vanik Hearings (1978), supra note 290, at 80 (statement of Edgar B. Speer,
Chairman, American Iron and Steel Institute).
321. OberstarHearings, supra note 292, at 12 (testimony of Thomas C. Graham).
322. Long Hearings (1967), supra note 286, at 888. See also Dent Hearings,supra
note 293, at 201 (statement of United Steelworkers).
323. Long Hearings (1967), supra note 286, at 889-90.
324. Id. at 893.
325. Mills Hearings (1970), supra note 305, at 1826.
326. Id. In this respect, the Union radically reversed a position it had earlier
adopted. Testifying before the Senate Finance Committee in 1966, the Union
maintained that, "as far as employment in the steel industry is concerned,
the rate of national industrial activity is much more important than the balance of imports and exports. A prosperous year will increase employment of
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Throughout the 1970's, the Union held fast to the above diagnosis of the problem. In diverse forums, it repeatedly maintained
that "unreasonable imports" result from "international excess
steelmaking capacity"; that "excess steel capacity will overhang
the world marketplace for several years"; and therefore, that an
"international mechanism is needed to achieve quick relief under
agreed upon rules as a long term solution to the problems of world"327
wide over-capacity ....
3. Need for BreathingSpace to Make Adjustments
Finally, steel companies and the Union argued that foreign
competition deterred sorely-needed domestic investment. Only
with suitable protection by the government, they warned, would
modernization of the U.S. steel industry proceed. Once again, the
argument paralleled that of the auto industry.
Testifying before the House Ways and Means Committee in
1973, the American Iron and Steel Institute declared that an "adequate guarantee against both continuing and spasmodic disruptive
increases in imports stimulated by the domestic policies of other
countries is essential to the health of both the economy and the
industry" and warned committee members that the "threat of such
increases is a serious deterrent to expansion of capacity in this
country in view of the large sums of capital and the long planning
and construction time involved."328 A spokesman for the specialty
steel industry added that "American producers and U.S. capital
markets are already reluctant to make future planned and re329
quired investments and this reluctance promises to continue."
When next it resurfaced, the argument underscored the importance of "breathing space." "During the long lead time, 5 to 8
years, individual steel companies will need to plan and carry out
the needed modernization of their plant and equipment," AISI
president Peabody contended before the House Subcommittee on
Trade, "the Government must take action to assure that imports
do not continue to disrupt our domestic markets through either
steelworkers far greater than a surge of imports will reduce such employment." Long Hearings (1966), supra note 285, at 237 (statement of Meyer
Bernstein, International Affairs Director, United Steelworkers).
327. Vanik Hearings (1978), supra note 290, at 106, 113-14.
328. Mills Hearings (1973), supra note 287, at 3963 (statement of Stewart S. Cort,
Chairman, American Iron and Steel Institute).
329. Id. at 3973 (statement of Roger S. Ahlbrandt, American Specialty Metals Industry). See also Long Hearings (1974), supra note 290, at 1057 (statement of
Mark T. Anthony, Vice President and General Manager, Kaiser Steel Corp.);
Id. at 1081-82 (statement of Stewart S. Cort, Chairman, American Iron and
Steel Institute).
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quantity or price." 330 "Only with assurances of this type," he
warned, "will our competitive market system commit sufficient
capital to steel on the scale required to maintain a modern industry in this country."3 31 Similarly, a United States Steel Corporation spokesman urged "a limitation for some temporary period in
332
which the domestic industry can regain its strength."
Union officials, again, dutifully reiterated and re-emphasized
management's arguments in a succession of public forums. In
1970, the Union called for an extension of voluntary restraint agreements "or for legislative protection to accomplish one of the stated
purposes for the restraint, namely, to provide a lead period for the
industry to modernize." 333 Questioned about the conglomerate diversification of Big Steel, the Union's representative, Mr. Sheehan,
argued that labor had joined with management on import protection in order to assure that steel earnings would be reinvested in
steel facilities:
One of the reasons that industry gives for its need to diversify or to
conglomerate is the fact that their share of our expanding market was being too rapidly seized by foreign imports. So the union joined with the
industry and said, "Well let us guarantee or let us moderate that share of
to keep investments of the steel industry in the steel
the market so as
'3 34
industry, itself."
330. Vanik Hearings (1980), supra note 291, at 110.
331. Id. at 111.
332. Id. at 54 (testimony of John Mangan, Counsel, Western Steel Division, United
States Steel Corp.).
333. Mills Hearings (1970), supra note 305, at 1827 (statement of John J. Sheehan,
Legislative Director, United Steelworkers).
334. Id. at 1829. Even the Union, however, could scarcely suppress its alarm at
U.S. Steel's recent multi-billion dollar acquisition of Marathon Oil:
When reviewing the status of the steel industry, there is one matter
that has drawn particular attention recently, both among those in the
private and public sectors. Repeatedly, in these past two weeks, we
have been asked for our comments on the efforts by U.S. Steel Corporation, the largest employer of our members, to merge with Marathon
Oil. Corporate mergers are not new to the American scene. Conglomerate enterprise raises a host of public and private policy issues,
and extends well beyond the mandate of this Subcommittee. We do
not see such ventures as compatible with the need for reindustrializing the American enterprise system. Again, it is merely a transfer of
wealth made possible by the liberalization of tax laws for corporations, and the willingness of corporations to use capital and debt to
finance non-productive exchanges of assets.
With respect to U.S. Steel's multi-billion dollar venture, our own
preference is obvious. There is a vital need for modernization of
steel facilities. Through modernization we can improve efficiency
and enhance the competitive structure of the U.S. steel industry. In
this way jobs can be preserved and product markets can be saved or
retrieved.
Not even U.S. Steel can boast of having a full range of modern
technology in its mills. Unless or until the Corporation undertakes a
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Mr. I.W. Abel, president of the Union, reiterated the argument
in his testimony before the Senate Finance Committee in 1973:
You do not build a steel mill for $1 million. It now runs $500 million to
build a modem integrated steel mill. This is just an awful lot of capital to
raise and to invest and, when there is the danger of foreign competition
taking 335
all of the business from you, it is hard to raise that kind of
money.

Union spokesmen insisted, as had management, that import protection was essential if modernization was to occur. "We need immediate relief," USW president McBride urged in 1977, "so that the
industry can undertake the task of modernization without having
its domestic markets stolen during the process." 33 6 Citing the
"desperate need to modernize some of the older mills, particularly
in older steel communities," a 1977 union policy statement argued
that "imports have not only cost us jobs, they have caused so much
idle capacity in our mills, in most of the last 15 years, that our industry has had no incentive to modernize and expand, and many
337
companies have lacked the capital to modernize."
Finally, in 1980, in testimony before the International Trade
Commission, management and union agreed that "disruptive"
steel imports have a deleterious effect on "the rate of modernization, the addition of new capacity, and the ability of our industry to
generate necessary investment capital," and that such imports
338
constitute "a significant discouragement to capital investment."
full modernization program, it risks the goodwill and trust of its employees and of those outside the industry who are convinced that a
revitalization of our steel base in the U.S. is feasible.
OberstarHearings,supra note 292, at 27 (statement of Lloyd McBride, President, United Steelworkers).
335. Long Hearings (1974), supra note 290, at 1340.
336. Vanik Hearings (1977), supra note 295, at 313.
337. Vanik Hearings (1978), supra note 290, at 109 (testimony of John J. Sheehan,
Legislative Director, United Steelworkers).

338. UNrrED STEEL WORKERS, THE IMPACT OF STEEL IMPORTS ON DOMESTIC EMPLoYiiENT, U.S. INTERNATIONAL TRADE COwmnssION 4 (1980) (testimony of
John J. Sheehan, Legislative Director). See also OberstarHearings, supra
note 292, at 28 (statement of Lloyd McBride, President, United Steelworkers).
Two additional points should be mentioned in this context. First, Union
concerns regarding investment and modernization are not limited solely to
the alleged financial needs of the companies. Import competition, of course,
undermines the Union's bargaining power-a phenomenon graphically attested to in a 1967 position paper distributed by the Steelworkers:
[Imported steel] is resented all the more, because it is a kind of scab
steel that is coming in. It's steel which weakened our collective bargaining position and interferes with our negotiation of satisfactory
agreements. Foreign steel makes a breakdown in contract negotiation a kind of suicide pact, for a full-scale strike, such as we had in
1959, could easily turn the major part of the American market over to
overseas producers.
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4. Summary: Steel
As shown above, power wielded by firms in an oligopolistic output market conjoined with power of organized labor on the input
side to demand governmental neutralization of foreign competition. This exercise of coalescing vertical power has been successful in obtaining a succession of "voluntary" restraints, orderly
marketing agreements, and price floors to constrain and restrain
imports. 339
Most recently, the industry has seized upon a compliant administration and the threat of formal complaints before government
agencies as the tools with which to forge a world steel cartel. In
exchange for American producers' withdrawal of more than forty
trade complaints, Common Market producers collectively consented in late 1982 to submit to detailed quantitative restrictions
on their exports of a broad range of products to the United States.
These restrictions include limiting their combined share of U.S.
sales of carbon and alloy steel products to 5.44 percent; pipe and
tube products, 5.9 percent; hot rolled sheet and strip, 6.81 percent;
cold rolled sheet, 5.11 percent; plates, 5.36 percent; structurals, 9.91
percent; wire rod, 4.29 percent; hot rolled bars, 2.38 percent;
coated sheet, 3.27 percent; tin plate, 2.2 percent; rails, 8.9 percent;
and sheet piping, 21.85 percent.340 And, as the chairman of U.S.
Steel was quick to point out, this agreement "addressed only 30%
of our problems," 341 thereby serving notice that the industry would
soon demand similar arrangements with Japanese and other producers accounting for the remainder of U.S. imports.342 In response, EEC countries announced that, in light of restraints on
their exports to the U.S., they too would move to restrict their imports from other countries. 343 Further, the Reagan administration-attuned to the dismay expressed by Steelworker president
McBride at the exclusion of specialty steels from the EEC compact-recently negotiated a parallel, four-year arrangement in this
field as well.34 4 With regard to this latter development, a prominent
business periodical was moved to remark that "seldom does an ac-

339.
340.
341.
342.
343.
344.

United Steelworkers of America, The Import Problem in Steel 4 (1970) (position paper distributed at AFL-CIO Emergency Trade Conference).
Second, the Union has not succeeded in squelching all dissent. "The
American steel industry's sick because it has failed to modernize," Ron Wiesen of Local 1253 testified in 1981, concluding that "[i] mported steel may be a
symptom, but it is not the disease." OberstarHearings,supra note 292, at 264.
Adams, supra note 270, at 38-46.
Wall St. J., Oct. 22, 1982, at 3, col. 1.
Bus. Wx., Nov. 8, 1982, at 42, col. 2.
Wall St. J., supra note 340, at 3, col. 1.
N. Y. Times, Oct. 22, 1982, at 32, col. 1.
Id. at 36, col. 1; Wall St. J., July 6, 1983, at 3, col. 1.
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tion help so few, hurt so many, and anger nearly everyone. 3 45
In this industry, then, coalescing vertical power has done more
than achieve protection from competition for a domestic oligopoly.
It may yet become the catalyst for cartelization of world trade in
346
steel.
IV. SOME ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF COALESCING POWER
The virulence with which management and labor have fought
for protectionism in the public as well as private sector affords a
striking illustration of tacit vertical collusion and coalescing power
in action. It also reflects the common perception by both management and labor that immunity from competition confers private
benefits on both groups and, therefore, that government protection
from competition is in their rational-albeit, short-run-mutual
self-interest. A brief review of the benefits derived by labor and
management from protectionism explains the assiduity with which
they have mobilized their coalescing power in the political arena.
It also gives some indication of the social costs resulting from the
exercise of coalescing power.
A.

Airline Industry

In the airline industry, for example, Civil Aeronautics Board
(CAB) regulation has given management protection against competitive entry and competitive price cutting. 347 While that protection did not yield abnormal profits (because carrier energy was
diverted into costlier service such as more flights, more planes, and
more frills),348 it did give management the freedom to lead the
quiet life and the discretion to charge exorbitant fares. This is underscored by a comparison of fares and service in California and
Texas- where entry is possible and price competition permittedwith CAB controlled rates on interstate flights. Thus, Table 1
shows that in 1976 a traveler between Los Angeles and San Fran345. FORTUNE, Aug. 8, 1983, at 55.
346. This is not to say that the coalescence between management and organized
labor is at all times perfectly complete. For example, the U.S. Steel Corporation's recent announcement of the possibility that it might import slab steel
from abroad for final finishing domestically was denounced by the Steelworkers Union. Wall St. J., June 27, 1983, at 4, col. 1. Yet, by fanning the Union's
protectionist fever, this development may very well serve to further solidify
the management-labor bloc against import competition.
347. Kennedy Report (1975), supra note 17, at 77-141.
348. Id. at 3.
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TABLE 1
COMPARISON BETWEEN INTERSTATE AND INTRASTATE FARESt
Passengers
Fare'

City-pair

Miles

2

transported

3

Block
time

4

*Los Angeles-San Francisco .....

$18.75

338

57,483,419

:55

Chicago-Minneapolis ..........
New York-Pittsburgh ..........
*Los Angeles-San Diego .........
*San Francisco-Sacramento .....

38.89
37.96
10.10
9.73

339
335
109
86

1,424,621
975,344
2,518,701
505,148

1:06
1:05
:30
:30

Portland-Seattle ..............
*Los Angeles-Sacramento .......

22.22
20.47

129
373

1,217,381
915,077

:35
1:00

Boston-Washington ...........
Cleveland-New York ..........
Chicago-Kansas City ..........
Chicago-Pittsburgh ............
*San Francisco-San Diego .......

41.67
43.52
37.96
41.67
26.21

399
416
404
413
456

981,456
910,270
813,235
972,543
399,639

1:07
1:25
1:10
1:23
1:05

Detroit-Philadelphia ...........
Dallas/Fort Worth-New
Orleans .....................
New York-Raleigh/Durham ...
Columbus-New York ..........
*Dallas/Fort Worth-Houston ....
*Dallas/Fort Worth-San Antonio

45.37

454

313,439

1:25

44.44
44.44
47.22
23.15/13.89
23.15/13.89

442
423
478
239
248

522,223
267,272
294,682
1,620,000
980,000

1:15
1:15
1:18
:50
:50

Las Vegas-Los Angeles ........
Chicago-St. Louis .............

28.70
29.63

236
258

1,181,466
953,604

:50
:50

*Houston-San Antonio ..........
23.15/13.89
191
490,000
:40
Boston-New York .............
24.07
191
2,493,882
:50
Reno-San Francisco ...........
25.93
192
312,811
:46
Miami-Orlando ................
25.93
193
514,475
:40
t Reprinted from Kennedy Report (1975), supra note 17, at 41.
* Intrastate market.
I Interstate markets: Coach fare, Intrastate markets; Economy fare. Source: "Official Airline Guide," Feb. 1, 1975.
2 Source: Book of Official CAB Route Maps and Airport-to-Airport Mileages. Most
entries are volume-weighted averages of two or more airport-to-airport mileages.
3 Source: Interstate markets-CAB service segment data, special computer tabulation, reporting period from July 1, 1973 to June 30, 1974. Intrastate markets-California PUC form 1504 report, reporting period from Apr. 1, 1973 to Mar. 31, 1974.
4 Average scheduled flight time. Source: Official Airline Guide, Feb. 1, 1975.
5 California markets include traffic to and from suburban airports. Los AngelesSan Francisco includes 12 airport-pairs for example:
LAX-SFO 18.75
ONT-SFO 20.47

338
363

2,984,985
334,208

59.0
60.2

:55
:55
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cisco (an intrastate, unregulatedroute) could fly 338 miles for
$18.75 while a traveler between Chicago and Minneapolis (a CAB
regulated route) had to pay $38.89 for roughly the same distance.
Similarly, a traveler between Dallas and Houston (an intrastate,
unregulated route) had to pay a maximum of $23.15 for 239 miles
while a traveler between Las Vegas and Los Angeles (a CAB regulated route) paid $28.70 for 236 miles.
As Table 1 shows, fares charged in Texas and California in the
absence of regulation were approximately 50 to 70 percent of the
CAB controlled fares for similar distances and kinds of routes. As
the Senate Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedures observed, "[e]xperience in California and Texas suggests
that less regulation and more open competition would bring about
safe air service with substantially lower fares, more frequent
flights, and fewer frills." 3 49 Obviously airline management saw
that prospect as a threat to its vested interests.
Also threatened by the prospect of deregulation was organized
labor which found security under the protective umbrella that
CAB regulation provided for the airlines. Regulation permitted
the carriers not only to charge exorbitant fares but to accede to
persistent wage escalation for various categories of airline employees represented by the Airline Pilots Association, the Transport
Workers Union, and the Machinists. In 1963, as Table 2 shows, airline employees as a group received an average salary of $7,781, i.e.,
1.7 times more than the $4,625 average earned by all workers in the
economy. By 1976, the average salary for airline employees had
risen to $21,500, or more than double the level of workers generally.
The rate of increase over the 1963-1976 period ranged from 168 to
217 percent for airline workers in contrast to 117 percent for workers generally.
TABLE 2
LEVEL AND TRENDS IN DOMESTIC AIRLINE WAGESt
All Airline Pilots and
All Workersa Employees Copilots Mechanics
Average annual salary
1963
1976
Increase, 1963-1976

$ 4,625
10,027

$ 7,781
21,500

$18,272
49,000

$ 7,434
23,600

117%

176%

168%

217%

t Sources: Economic Report of the President256, 268 (1982) (all workers); StatisticalAbstracts of the U.S. (1965 & 1978) (airline data).
a Total wage income divided by total employment.
349. Id. at 40.
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Clearly, collective bargaining in a government regulated industry, protected from "unbridled" competition, yielded succulent
fruits for labor-as well as for management.
B.

Trucking Industry

In trucking, the same pattern is observable. Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) regulation has given management protection against competitive entry and competitive price cutting. As
a result, the ICC granted new operating authority only where the
350
proposed service would not divert traffic from existing carriers.
Also, the ICC permitted and, indeed, encouraged trucking firms to
join rate bureaus to fix rates on particular shipments, and frequently suspended the lower rates filed by independent truckers. 351 Not surprisingly, the net effect of ICC regulation has been to
raise rates above the level which would prevail in the absence of
regulation.
A number of recent studies document this conclusion. 35 2 One
study, for example, found that average revenue per ton-mile was
6.73 percent lower in "unregulated" Canadian provinces than in
regulated provinces and in the United States. 353 Another studyin what can be considered a controlled "before and after" experiment-compared trucking rates for frozen fruits and vegetables
when they were classified as "regulated" commodities to trucking
rates for the same commodities after they were reclassified by the
courts as having "exempt" status. Deregulating the carriage of
these commodities resulted in a dramatic price decline: 12 to 59
percent in particular markets for fresh and frozen poultry and a
354
weighted average of 19 percent for frozen fruits and vegetables.
Yet a third study, based on a survey by the National Broiler Council, compared the rates on fresh poultry shipped by exempt carri350. Kennedy Report (1980), supra note 17, at 30-31.
351. Id. at 80-88.
352. See, e.g., Moore, The Beneficiaries of Trucking Regulation, 21 J. L. & ECON. 32
(1978) [hereinafter cited as Moore (1978)]; TransportationAct of 1972: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Transportationof the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., pts. 1-3 (1972) [hereinafter
cited as TransportationHearings]. See also T. MOORE, TRUCKING REGULATION: LESSONS FROM EUROPE (American Enterprise Institute-Hoover Policy
Studies, 1975).
353. Sloss, Regulation of Motor FreightTransportation,1 BELL J. ECON. &MGcrr.
Sci. 327 (1970).
354. SNITZLER AND BYRNES, INTERSTATE TRUCKING OF FROZEN FRUITS AND VEGETABLES UNDER AGRICULTURAL EXEMPTION (U.S.D.A. Marketing Research Rep.
No. 316 (1959)); SN1TZLER AND BYRNES, INTERSTATE TRUCKING OF FRESH AND
FROZEN POULTRY UNDER AGRICULTURAL EXEMPTION
search Rep. No. 224 (1958)).

(U.S.D.A.

Marketing Re-
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ers with rates on cooked poultry shipped by regulated carriers. 55
Over the same routes and between the same points, the unregulated rates were found to be some 33 percent less than the regulated rates. 3 56 In short, cartelization under the aegis of
government regulation had achieved predictable results.
Also predictable was the impact of trucking regulation on organized labor. Aside from the benefits derived by drivers from the
additional mileage covered as a result of "deadhead" hauls and
circuitous routes, regulation-unionization seems to have resulted
in significant wage increases in the industry. Thus, according to
one study summarized in Table 3, compensation paid to drivers
30 percent higher than that of their unregulated
was more than
57
counterparts.
TABLE 3
AVERAGE ANNUAL EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION IN REGULATED AND
UNREGULATED TRUCKING

All Class I-Property
Class I-Property
(Revenue $1 million-5 billion)
Class 11-Property

(1972)t

Regulated

Unregulated

Percentage of
Regulated
over
Unregulated

$12,299

$8,504

44.6

11,099
10,033

8,504
7,566

30.5
32.6

t Table reprinted from Moore (1978), supra note 352, at 333.
Source: 1 U.S. Bureau of the Census, SC 72-S-7, 1972 Census of Selected Service Industries, tab. 3, at 17 (1973); ICC Transport Statistics in the United States,
releases 8 & A (pt. 7, released: Sept. 7, 1972).

A 1973 study indicated that the typical owner-operator (unregulated and not represented by a union) would earn about $11,125 for
a 250-day work year, while the average compensation received by
the unionized driver for a regulated Class I intercity hauler of general freight was $17,249.358 After surveying these and other studies,
Thomas G. Moore concluded that:
A conservative estimate of the impact regulation-unionization has on
wages of truckers, helpers, and platform workers would therefore be about
50 percent. Some of the evidence suggests the gain could be as large as 55
percent; the most conservative estimate is 37 percent. This implies that
355.
356.
357.
358.

TransportationHearings,supra note 352.
Id. at 170.
Moore (1978), supra note 352, at 32 (quoting U.S. Bureau of Census 1972).
D. WYCHOFF & D. MAIsTER, THE OWNER-OPERATOR: INDEPENDENT TRUCKER 36
(1975) quoted in Moore (1978), supra note 352, at 337.
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the gains to Teamster
members would have been between $1 billion and
359
$1.3 billion in 1972.

When the "rents" received by the owners of ICC certificates and
permits ($1.5 to $2 billion in 1972) are added to the above figures, it
becomes obvious that the stake that management and labor had in
continued regulation of the trucking was substantial. 36 0 It meant
excess revenues for the industry of about $3.4 billion in 1972, of
which, according to Moore, between 74 and 97 percent constituted
monopoly "rents" accruing to capital and labor. 36 1
C.

Automobile Industry

Since the end of World War II, automobile prices have followed
a typical oligopoly pattern-their outstanding characteristics being
uniformity and upward rigidity. 362 As Table 4 shows, the average
retail price of new cars, including imports, increased from $3,200 in
TABLE 4
NEW CAR PRICES, IMPORT PENETRATION IN THE U.S. AUTOMOBILE
MARKET, AND CONSUMER PRICE INDEXt

Year
1967
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
t
*

**
*
359.
360.
361.
362.

Average Yearly
Retail Prices
(dollars)*

Index of Average Retail
Prices for New Cars

Market Share of
Imported Cars
(percent)

$3,200
3,240
3,400
3,430
3,730
3,690
3,930
4,390
4,750
5,470
6,120
6,470
6,950
7,530
8,850
9,750**

100.0
101.3
106.3
107.3
116.6
115.3
122.8
137.2
148.4
170.9
191.3
202.2
217.2
235.3
276.6
304.7

9.3
10.3
11.6
15.2
15.3
14.8
15.4
15.9
18.3
14.8
18.6
17.7
21.9
26.7
27.3
28.1***

Price statistics available from National Automobile Dealers Associations; import statistics available from Ward's Automotive Reports.
includes price of imported cars
average for first 8 months
average for first 10 months
Moore (1978), supra note 352, at 339.
Id. at 342.
Id.
See Senate Judiciary Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly, Administered
Pricesof Automobiles, S. Rep. No. 351, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958).
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1967 to $9,750 in the first eight months of 1982, or more than 200
percent. 63 Apparently management was loath to abandon its policy of persistent price escalation in spite of the 1974/75 recession,
the 1980/82 depression, and the 200 percent increase of the import
share in the U.S. domestic market. Management's belief was that
if foreign competition constituted a threat to its market control, the
most efficacious cure would be mandatory or "voluntary" import
quotas negotiated under the protective benevolence of the federal
government. In other words, the preferred solution was protection
in the form of governmental restraints on competition.
Organized labor's compensation policy during this period was
strikingly parallel to management's pricing policy. Between 1967
and 1980, as Table 5 shows, 364 hourly compensation in the motor
vehicle industry increased 214 percent compared to a 179 percent
increase in manufacturing as a whole; output per worker increased
39 percent compared to 35 percent in manufacturing; unit labor
costs increased 127 percent compared to 107 percent in
manufacturing.
Charles L. Schultze, a former Chairman of the President's
Council of Economic Advisors, summarized the implications of
this wage escalation record, stating:
In the mid-1960s hourly employment costs (wages and fringe benefits)
in the major auto companies were about 20% above the average for manufacturing industries. Every three years since, the labor contract negotiated between industry and the union has widened the gap. By 1978 wages
and fringes at the major auto companies had risen to almost 50% above
the all-manufacturing average. Those extra costs were passed on in
higher prices.
Finally, in 1979--faced with mounting interest rates, an incipient recession, sharply higher gasoline prices, growing resistance to large American
cars and increased imports from Japan-what did the industry do? It negotiated a contract that by 1980 put
auto wages and fringes about 60%
365
above the manufacturing average.

Obviously, the exercise of coalescing power brought consistent
short-run gains to both management and labor. But, as one might
have predicted, these gains were tenable in the long-run only so
long as effective competition could be successfully restrained in
the final product market. Hence, as Schultze ruefully observed,
"the UAW and the auto industry, calling attention to what is undoubtedly a serious problem of import penetration, are urging the
government to validate these gains, and to make possible the price
363. See supra Table 4.
364. MIcHIGAN FiscAL AND EcoNo ic STRUCTURE 170 (I-LE. Brazer ed. 1982) [hereinafter cited as Brazer].
365. Wall St. J., March 20, 1981, at 24, col. 4.
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TABLE 5
INDICES OF HOURLY LABOR COMPENSATION, OUTPUT PER EMPLOYEE AND UNIT LABOR COST IN THE MOTOR VEHICLES INDUSTRY
AND IN ALL MANUFACTURING IN THE UNITED STATES (1967=100)t

YEAR

Compensation
All
Motor
Mfgs.
Vehicles

Output Per Worker
All
Motor
Mfgs.
Vehicles

100
100
1967
107
107
1968
115
113
1969
122
122
1970
130
139
1971
137
148
1972
147
159
1973
162
178
1974
182
200
1975
196
218
1976
212
243
1977
230
265
1978
252
284
1979
279
314
1980
t Table reprinted from Brazer, supra

100
100
104
106
105
105
105
103
112
117
117
120
123
122
121
121
124
128
129
134
133
143
134
142
135
139
135
1391
note 364 at 170.

Unit Labor Cost
All
Motor
Mfgs.
Vehicles
100
101
108
119
119
123
130
148
156
162
170
187
205
227

100
103
109
117
117
117
119
135
147
151
160
172
187
207

1
The statistic in this cell was missing. It was conservatively assumed to
remain the same as in 1979 (in line with all manufacturing although by reason of the severe depression in the industry there is reason to believe that it
might have been lower.
All figures are rounded, but calculations were made at the first decimal
level.
Because of data constraints, the series for all manufacturing applies to all
employees, while that for Motor Vehicles applies only to production workers. However, it was possible to compare the output per hour series for all
employees and for production workers in the auto industry throughout the
entire period: they are almost indentical. Likewise, it was possible to compare the hourly compensation series for all employees and for production
workers in "all manufacturing" for the last six years: they are very similar.
Sources: The all manufacturing data are from the BLS. "International Comparisons of Manufacturing Productivity and Labor Costs," May 20, 1981. For
autos, the data are from the BLS. Indices of Output Per Employee
(1967=100) in Motor Vehicles and Equipment" and "Estimated Hourly
Compensation of Production Workers in the Motor Vehicles and Equipment Industry, 14 countries, 1975-1980." With an adjusted census of manufacturing series going back to 1967.

Notes

66
increases necessary to pay for them, with import protection."
In short, price/wage escalation, effectuated through the exercise of coalescing power, is possible only in protected markets artificially shielded from the impact of competition.

366. Id.

19831
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Steel Industry

Prior to the burgeoning of steel imports of the 1960's, and the
long strike of 1959, the domestic steel industry used its formidable
3 67
oligopoly power to engineer a persistent increase in steel prices.
According to the Council of Economic Advisers, these price increases were a principal feature of successive cost-push inflations
in the post-World War HI period:
Steel prices played an important role in the general price increases of
the 1950s. Between 1947 and 1951, the average increase in the price of basic steel products was 9 percent per year, twice the average increase of all
wholesale prices. The unique behavior of steel prices was most pronounced in the mid-1950's. While the wholesale price index was falling an
average of 0.9 percent annually from 1951 to 1955, the price index for steel
was rising an average of 4.8 percent per year. From 1955 to 1958, steel
prices were increasing 7.1 percent annually, or almost three times as fast
as wholesale
prices generally. No other major sector shows a similar
368
record.

During the 1960's, largely because of significantly intensifying
import competition, the upward pressure of steel prices was somewhat attenuated. Between January, 1960 and December, 1968, a period of nine years, the composite steel price index increased 4.1
points-or .45 points per year.36 9 Starting in January, 1969, however, after the State Department had successfully persuaded the
Europeans and Japanese to accept "voluntary" quotas on their
sales to the United States (that is, to enter into an informal international steel cartel), imports were cut back drastically and domestic steel prices resumed their pre-1960 climb. In the four years
between January, 1969 and December, 1972, the steel price index
rose 26.7 points-or 6.67 points per year.370 Stated differently, after
the import quotas went into effect, the annual rate of increase in
steel prices was fourteen times greater than it had been in the nine
years prior thereto. Once again, through the use of coalescing
power, management and labor have achieved their foreseeable
goal: that is, the development of a protectionist economic climate
under which both can thrive at an annual cost to the United States
economy variously estimated at between 338 million and 1 billion
367. W. ADAMS,supra note 203, at 92-99.
368. COUNCI. OF ECONOMIC ADviSORS, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON STEEL PRICES
8-9 (April 1975).

369. See

COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNrTED STATES, ECONOMIC AND FOREIGN
POLICY EFFECTS OF VOLUNTARY RESTRAINT AGREEMENTS ON TEXTIES AND

STEEL, REPORT B-179, 342 at 23 (1974)
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370. Id.
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37
dollars. 1

The Trigger Price Mechanism had similar consequences. Its
quantitative impact was substantial. On December 7, 1977, one day
after the concept of trigger pricing was announced by President
Carter, a steel company executive stated that United States steel

prices would be increased in the first quarter of 1978. Shortly
thereafter, a 5.5 percent increase-reduced from an original 10.5

percent increase-in the domestic price of basic steel products was
posted. This was followed by a further price rise of 1.1 percent in
April, 1978.372
On May 10, 1978, the United States Treasury Department announced that it was raising trigger prices by 5.5 percent on sheet,
plate, wire, and cold-finished bars; 13.9 percent on angles; 14 percent on reinforcing bars; and 14.5 percent on flat bars.37 3 On August 2, the Treasury Department raised the trigger prices by
another 4.86 percent, effective October 1, 1978;374 trigger price increases for the calendar year 1978 totalled 10.6 percent.
While domestic steelmakers had raised their list prices by some
9.5 percent as of October 1, 1978, steel buyers reported that the
prices they actually had to pay increased by as much as 15 percent
because, as the Wall Street Journal
noted, "last fall's widespread
37 5
discounting. . . evaporated."
The inflationary impact on the United States economy was, of
course, profound. Considering only the original trigger prices announced by the Treasury in January, 1978, the Federal Trade Commission, for instance, estimated the direct cost increase to steel
consumers at $1 billion.376 An official of the Brookings Institute
estimated that the direct price effect could be as much as $1.5 billion.377 Kurt Orban, a steel importer and international expert on
steel markets, found that the trigger price system had resulted in a
veritable price explosion and estimated the increased steel costs to
consumers at $4 billion.378 Finally, if the domestic steel industry is
to be believed in its claim that imports have caused transaction
prices to be $60 per ton below list prices, then estimates of increased steel costs could range up to $6 billion. These estimates, it
should be noted, were based on the trigger prices of January, 1978,
371. Magee, The Welfare Effects of Restrictions on U.S. Trade, BROOKINGS PAPERS
645-701 (1972); COMPTROLLER GENERA, supra note 369, at 23.
372. Adams, supra note 270, at 42.
373. 43 Fed. Reg. 20,020 (1978) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. § 31).
374. 43 Fed. Reg. 33,993 (1978).
375. Wall St. J., Sept. 26, 1978, at 1, col. 1.
376. FEDERAL TRADE COMIUSSION, THE UNITED STATES STEEL INDUSTRY AND ITS INTERNATIONAL RIVALs 559-65 (1977).
377. Wall St. J., supra note 375, at 1, col. 1.
378. American Metal Market, March 29, 1978, at 1, col. 3.
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and do not, therefore, take account of their 10.63 percent increase
the following year.
Organized labor, of course, derived short-run gains from this
protectionism, which permitted the steel industry to play its price
escalation game with virtual impunity. Between 1964 and 1980, as
Table 6 shows, hourly compensation in iron and steel increased by
282 percent compared to 212 percent in manufacturing as a whole;
output per hour increased 19 percent and 40 percent, respectively;
and unit labor cost increased 221 percent and 123 percent,
3
respectively. 79
TABLE 6
INDICES OF LABOR COMPENSATION, PRODUCTIVrrY, AND UNIT LABOR
COST IN IRON AND STEEL AND ALL MANUFACTURING FOR 1972-80
(1964=100) IN THE UNITED STATESt
Hourly
Compensation

Output Per Hour

Unit Labor Cost

YEAR

Iron and
Steel

All
Mfgs.

Iron and
Steel

All
Mfgs.

Iron and
Steel

All
Mfgs.

1964
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980

100
161
176
202
239
257
277
308
341
382

100
153
165
182
204
220
238
258
283
312

100
116
121
124
116
120
116
125
124
119

100
122
129
126
129
134
138
139
141
140

100
138
145
163
206
215
239
246
276
321

100
125
128
145
157
163
172
185
201
223

t

Brazer, supra note 364, at 166.

As was found to be the case in the automobile industry, the gap
between hourly employment costs in the steel industry and manufacturing as a whole widened; according to Charles Schultze, the
cost differential rose from 25 percent in the mid-1960's to 60 percent
in 1980.380 This record, when superimposed on constantly escalating prices, meant declining competitiveness for the steel industry,
and militated toward protectionist governmental restraints on foreign competition-a bailout from the self-inflicted injury wrought
by the exercise of coalescing power.
379. Brazer, supra note 364, at 166.
380. Wall St. J., supra note 365, at 24, col. 4.
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CONCLUSION

The foregoing case studies document the efforts of a labor-management coalition in four major industries to secure governmental
restraints on competition. The coalition partners advocated positions that were uncannily parallel and substantively indistinguishable. They advanced and endlessly reiterated arguments that
were couched in virtually identical rhetoric.
Unless these case studies are egregiously unrepresentative of
American industrial structure, some general conclusions and public policy implications are apropos:
1. In industries where producers possess monopoly (or oligopoly) power in the product market, and where powerful trade unions dominate the relevant labor markets, there is an almost
irresistable tendency toward tacit (if not, overt) vertical collusion.
Countervailing power-ostensibly a structural safeguard of the
public interest-is transmuted into coalescing power-a ready instrument for subverting the public interest.
2. Tacit vertical collusion and coalescing power are sustainable only where product markets are immune from effective competition. Hence, a paramount objective of the labor-industrial
complex is to obtain and/or preserve governmental protection
from competition in the form of entry controls, minimum rate regulation, immunity from the antitrust laws, import restraints, etc.
3. The exercise of tacit vertical collusion and coalescing power
has both micro-economic and macro-economic consequences. On
the micro-economic level, it militates toward noncompetitive structure in the affected industries which, in turn, leads to noncompetitive conduct which, ultimately, produces deficient industrial
performance.
4. On the macro-economic level, the most serious consequence
of tacit vertical collusion is a seemingly uncontrollable process of
cumulative price-wage-price escalation-an engine of cost-push inflation that undermines the effectiveness of macro-stabilization
policies. As Professor Henry C. Simons of the University of Chicago recognized over three decades ago, the efficacy of such macroeconomic tools as monetary and fiscal policy vitally hinges upon an
economy's underlying micro-economic market structure. "No
amount of monetary or fiscal stimulation," he wrote,
will give us adequate employment or investment, if strategically situated
unions and enterpriser monopolists insist upon utilizing improved demand conditions to increase their wages and prices rather than to increase
employment, investment, and output-or to hold up prices where improved technology is markedly reducing costs. And there is no reason
why organized producer groups, holding adequate organizational and
political power, should, acting in their separate interest, forego the opportunity to improve their relative position in such circumstances. They may,
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to be sure, injure themselves along with the community, all or most of
them being worse off by virtue of their restrictive measures than if none
had practiced them. But each group may be better off than if it alone had
behaved less monopolistically; and, short of dictatorship at one extreme
and real competition at the other, there would appear to be no means for
getting381co-ordinated or co-operative action from such groups as a
whole.
Simons concluded that "[t] he inherent conflict of interest between
each producer group and the community. . . must be reconciled or
avoided, either by the discipline of effective intragroup competi382
tion or by the dictation of absolute authority from above."
The only viable policy option, we suggest, lies in vigorous enforcement of the nation's antitrust statutes to obtain and maintain
structurally competitive markets-for the sake of industry-specific
performance, for macro-economic stability, and, perhaps not insignificantly, for freedom from dictation of absolute authority from
above.

381. H. SIMONS, ECONOMC POLICY FOR A FREE SOCIETY 115 (1948).
382. Id. at 120. Professor Olson recently arrived at a similar conclusion. "The
most important macroeconomic policy implication," to be drawn from his exhaustive examination of stagfliation, unemployment, and business cycles, he
states, "is that the best macroeconomic policy is a good microeconomic policy
.... If combinations dominate markets throughout the economy and the
government is always intervening on behalf of special interests, there is no
macroeconomic policy that can put things right." M. OLSON, THE RISE AND
DECLINE OF NATIONS 233 (1982).

